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Abstract
BINARY CODE REUSE DETECTION FOR REVERSE
ENGINEERING AND MALWARE ANALYSIS
He Huang
Code reuse detection is a key technique in reverse engineering. However, existing
source code similarity comparison techniques are not applicable to binary code. More-
over, compilers have made this problem even more diﬃcult due to the fact that dif-
ferent assembly code and control ﬂow structures can be generated by the compilers
even when implementing the same functionality. To address this problem, we present
a fuzzy matching approach to compare two functions. We ﬁrst obtain our initial map-
ping between basic blocks by leveraging the concept of longest common subsequence
on the basic block level and execution path level. Then, we extend the achieved map-
ping using neighborhood exploration. To make our approach applicable to large data
sets, we designed an eﬀective ﬁltering process using Minhashing and locality-sensitive
hashing.
Based on the approach proposed in this thesis, we implemented a tool named
BinSequence. We conducted extensive experiments to test BinSequence in terms
of performance, accuracy, and scalability. Our results suggest that, given a large
assembly code repository with millions of functions, BinSequence is eﬃcient and can
attain high quality similarity ranking of assembly functions with an accuracy above
90% within seconds.
We also present several practical use cases including patch analysis, malware anal-
ysis, and bug search. In the use case for patch analysis, we utilized BinSequence to
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compare the unpatched and patched versions of the same binary, to reveal the vul-
nerability information and the details of the patch. For this use case, a Windows
system driver (HTTP.sys) which contains a recently published critical vulnerability is
used. For the malware analysis use case, we utilized BinSequence to identify reused
components or already analyzed parts in malware so that the human analyst can fo-
cus on those new functionality to save time and eﬀort. In this use case, two infamous
malware, Zeus and Citadel, are analyzed. Finally, in the bug search use case, we
utilized BinSequence to identify vulnerable functions in software caused by copying
and pasting or sharing buggy source code. In this case, we succeeded in using Bin-
Sequence to identify a bug from Firefox. Together, these use cases demonstrate that
our tool is both eﬃcient and eﬀective when applied to real-world scenarios.
We also compared BinSequence with three state of the art tools: Diaphora,
PatchDiﬀ2 and BinDiﬀ. Experiment results show that BinSequence can achieve the
best accuracy when compared with these tools.
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Reverse engineering [33] is a primary step towards understanding the functionality
and behavior of a software when its source code is not available. However, reverse
engineering is a tedious and time-consuming process, and its success depends heavily
on the experience and knowledge of the reverse engineer. Moreover, as the software
to be analyzed grows in size, this task becomes overwhelming. Code reuse detection
is thus of great interest to reverse engineers. For example, given a binary and a
repository of already analyzed and commented code, one can speed up the analysis
by applying code reuse detection on the binary to identify identical or similar code
in the repository, and then focus only on the new functionality or components of the
binary.
Consider, for instance, malware reverse engineering. Malware authors do not
create viruses from scratch; instead, they tend to reuse their existing source code.
Besides, in order to not reinvent the wheel, they may leverage some open source
projects that provide certain functionality that they require. Identifying these reused
code not only greatly reduces the eﬀorts of analysis, but also helps in understanding
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the behavior of malware. For example, Citadel, derived from the leaked Zeus source
code, keeps most of the core components of Zeus intact [62], and the malware Flame
makes heavy use of SQLite [22], which is a light-weight database engine.
Code reuse detection is also of high interest to software maintainers and con-
sumers. In many software development environments, it is common practice to copy
and paste existing source code, as this can signiﬁcantly reduce programming eﬀort
and time. However, if the copied code contains a bug or vulnerability, and the de-
velopers copied the code without ﬁxing the bug, they may bring the bug into their
own project. Library reuse is a special case in which the developer either includes
the source code of a certain library into their project, or statically links to the library
directly. Either way, the bug contained in the copied code will be brought into the
new project. Code reuse detection can help identify such bugs resulting from shared
source code.
Last but not least, code reuse detection can be applied in numerous scenarios such
as software plagiarism detection, open source project license violation detection and
binary diﬃng.
Code reuse detection can be achieved by calculating the similarity of two code
regions. The higher the similarity, the more likely they are from the same source
code base. In this thesis, we present an approach for measuring the similarity of two
assembly functions.
1.2 Contributions
The contributions of our thesis can be summarized as follows:
• We designed a fuzzy matching approach to compare assembly functions. To
address the mutations introduced by the compilers, our fuzzy matching algo-
rithm operates at multiple levels, namely instruction level, basic block level and
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structure level.
• To prune the search space when comparing a target function against a vast
number of functions, we designed an eﬀective ﬁltering process with two ﬁlters
which can eﬃciently rule out functions that are not likely to be matched to our
target function. With the help of this ﬁltering process, we can compare one
function against millions of functions within seconds.
• Based on the approach presented in this thesis, we implemented a fully working
tool for binary code reuse detection. Extensive experiments show that our tool
is fast, accurate, and scalable.
• We introduced many use cases, including patch analysis, malware analysis, and
bug search, to demonstrate the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of our approach when
applied in real-world scenarios.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature
review and background knowledge of source code and binary code reuse detection. In
Chapter 3, we introduce the fuzzy matching approach we use to compare functions
and the detailed design of our ﬁltering process. In Chapter 4, we present the results
of the extensive experiments we conducted to evaluate our approach. Chapter 5
concludes the thesis and provides possible future research directions.
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Chapter 2
Related Work and Background
Knowledge
In general, when comparing two software for code reuse detection, there are three
diﬀerent scenarios according to the presence of the source code and binary code.
1. The two software are both available in source code form.
2. Only binary code is available.
3. One software is in source code form, while the other is in binary format.
For the ﬁrst case, we can perform source code reuse detection. In the second
scenario, binary code reuse detection can be applied. For the last scenario, binary to
source matching, or source to binary matching, can be conducted.
In this chapter, we ﬁrst introduce the state of the art techniques for source code
reuse detection and binary code reuse detection. We classify these techniques into
several categories, and for each category we introduce and brieﬂy describe some of
the most representative techniques.
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2.1 Source Code Reuse Detection
Source code reuse detection, sometimes known as source code clone detection, is a
well-explored area, and many approaches have been proposed in diﬀerent literatures.
In general, these approaches can be classiﬁed into ﬁve categories [70] [71], namely
text-based approaches, token-based approaches, tree-based approaches, graph-based
approaches and metrics-based approaches.
Text-based approaches
Text-based approaches consider the source code as a sequence of lines and compare
the raw source code directly. Normally, prior to the actual comparison, little or no
transformation/normalization is performed, except for basic steps such as comment
removal and whitespace removal.
The pioneer paper by Johnson [42] presented a substring matching approach where
the source ﬁles are ﬁrst transformed to remove characters such as white spaces. A
sliding window is then used to generate a set of substrings with a minimum length of
50 lines. When matching substrings, Johnson leverages a hash scheme based on the
Karp and Rabin string matching approach [45, 46] to generate a ﬁngerprint for each
substring. The intention is to save storage space and matching overhead. To allow
fuzzy matching, Johnson also normalizes the source code by replacing each maximal
sequence of alphanumeric characters by a single letter, such as ‘x’.
For example, the line
for(k = 1; k <= n; k ++)
would be normalized to




would be normalized to
#xxx
Despite the loss of information by normalizing the code, the number of matches would
not explode due to the requirement of a 50-line match.
Ducasse et al. [30] developed a language-independent visual approach to identify
source code reuse. First, the source code is transformed to remove all comments and
white spaces. Then, Ducasse et al. treat every line as an entity and compare it with
every other line (entity) using string matching. The result is a comparison matrix.
Subsequently, as shown in Figure 1, the scatter-plots are used to visualize the matrix.
In scatter-plots, diagonals of dots represent lines of reused source code. To capture
duplicated code that was changed inside one line, a pattern matcher is used to ﬁnd
diagonals with holes up to a certain size.
Marcus and Maletic [58] applied latent semantic indexing to detect high-level
concept clones such as abstract data types. They use a simpler equivalency deﬁnition
to reduce the cost and diﬃculty of detection at the expense of some lack in precision
and automation. Furthermore, their method would fail to identify two functions with
similar structure and functionality if comments are not available and the identiﬁer
names are diﬀerent.
Token-based approaches
Token-based approaches normally ﬁrst perform lexical analysis on the given source
code. Subsequently, a sequence of tokens is extracted from the source. The sequence
is then scanned for duplicated subsequences, and the corresponding source code is
reported as reused code. Compared to text-based approaches, token-based approaches
are generally more resilient to minor code changes such as formatting or spacing.
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d) Rectangles
a) Diagonals b) Diagonals with holes
c) Broken Diagonals
Figure 1: An example of diﬀerent conﬁgurations of dots and each letter represents a
line (Ducasse et al. [30])
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Kamiya et al. [43] proposed a language-independent token-based source code clone
detection tool named CCFinder. By transforming the input source code into a regular
form of token sequence, CCFinder can extract code clones in multiple programming
languages including C, C++, JAVA, and COBOL.
The ﬁrst step of the approach introduced by Kamiya et al. is to perform lexical
analysis on the given source ﬁles. During this step, each line is processed and divided
into tokens based on the speciﬁc lexical rule of the programming language. All of the
tokens from each source ﬁle are concatenated to form one single token sequence, and
all of the white spaces and comments are removed. The generated token sequence
is then transformed based on certain language-dependent transformation rules. For
example, for C++ code, Kamiya et al. perform the following modiﬁcations: removing
namespace attribution, removing template parameters, removing initialization lists,
separating function deﬁnitions, removing accessibility keywords, and converting the
source code into compound blocks (statements enclosed by braces).
Following these transformation rules,
void print_table (const map<string, string>& m) {
int c = 0 ;
map<string, string>::const_iterator i
= m.begin();
for (; i != m.end(); ++i) {
cout << c << ", "
<< i->first << " "





will be transformed into the following token sequence:
void print_table ( const map & m ) {
int c = 0 ;
const_iterator i
= m . begin ( ) ;
for ( ; i != m . end ( ) ; ++ i ) {
cout << c << ", "
<< i -> first << " "




The next step is to replace all identiﬁers related to types, variables, and constants
with a special token such as $p. In so doing, code regions with similar structures but
diﬀerent syntax, like variable names, can be matched as clone pairs. For example,
after replacing all identiﬁers, the above token sequence will become the following:
$p $p ( $p $p & $p ) {
$p $p = $p ;
$p $p
= $p . $p ( ) ;
for ( ; $p != $p . $p ( ) ; ++ $p ) {
$p << $p << $p
<< $p -> $p << $p





All equivalent subsequence pairs of the transformed token sequence are now de-
tected as clone pairs. In order to eﬃciently compute the matching, a suﬃx-tree
matching algorithm [38] is adopted, such that the clone location information is repre-
sented as a tree with sharing nodes for leading identical subsequences. By searching
leading nodes on the tree, all clone pairs can be identiﬁed.
Basit et al. [20] proposed an eﬃcient token-based clone detection tool named
Repeated Tokens Finder (RTF). Unlike most works that use suﬃx trees for string
matching, RTF uses more eﬃcient suﬃx arrays to detect string matches. Moreover,
it provides a simple and customizable tokenization mechanism.
Basit et al. ﬁrst use a language-speciﬁc tokenizer to assign each token class (e.g.,
keywords, operators, and comment markers) a unique numeric ID. Each token and its
location are stored for output generation. In this step, all blank lines and comments
are ignored and only one single large token string is generated from all source ﬁles.
During tokenization, RTF gives the user multiple options to tailor the generated token
string. First, RTF allows the user to suppress insigniﬁcant token classes. For example,
access modiﬁers such as private, protected, and public do not carry much information
in terms of clone detection and thus, this “noise” should be suppressed. RTF also
allows the user to equate diﬀerent token classes. For example, if users do not want
to diﬀerentiate between the types {int, short, long, ﬂoat, double} , they can use the
same ID to represent every member of these types. The motivation is to match codes
that only diﬀer in the type of certain variables. In addition, the tokenizer they use
can locate method boundaries to exclude clones that start from the middle of one
method and end in the middle of another. By doing this, human analysts can focus
on other meaningful clones.
Basit et al. treat clone detection as the problem of ﬁnding repeating substrings
within the token string. Speciﬁcally, they focus only on ﬁnding non-extendible (NE)
repeating substrings, as these NE repeating substrings correspond to clone classes
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[43]. To this end, they leverage the suﬃx array data structure [57]. The key beneﬁt
of using the suﬃx array instead of a suﬃx tree is a signiﬁcant reduction in memory
usage. Subsequently, in order to locate all NE repeating pairs of substrings, a variation
of the algorithm described in [16] is used so that the complete sets of NE repeats are
computed instead of just pairs.
Tree-based approaches
Tree-based approaches normally ﬁrst transform the source code into tree repre-
sentations, such as parse trees or abstract syntax trees (ASTs). In these tree repre-
sentations, variable names and literal values are abstracted away and similar subtrees
represent code clones.
Yang [78] proposed one of the ﬁrst approaches for identifying the syntactic dif-
ferences from the source code of two versions of the same program. First, both the
target and the reference source code are transformed into two parse trees using a
parser. In this tree representation, a node denotes a token (e.g., variable name) or a
non-terminal that represents a substructure (e.g., expression). The longest common
subsequence algorithm is then applied, to match nodes of both parse trees. A node
of a tree that does not have a matching node in the other tree is considered as a
diﬀerence. However, in this approach, the source code must be syntactically correct.
If part of the source code does not conform to the grammar, the parser will fail to
produce a tree representation; consequently, the whole comparison will fail.
Baxter et al. [21] proposed a tool using ASTs to detect duplicated source codes,
or in other words, clones. The ﬁrst step of their approach is to parse the source code,
and from this, produce an AST. Figure 2 shows an example of the generated AST.
Subsequently, Baxter et al. apply three diﬀerent algorithms on the generated ASTs
to ﬁnd clones.
Their ﬁrst algorithm, called Basic algorithm, is used to detect subtree clones.




    x=0;
    a=1;
    b=2;
    c=3;




    y=2;
    a=1;
    b=2;
    c=3;






































Figure 2: Abstract syntax tree (Baxter et al. [21])
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for similarity. To this end, Baxter et al. adopt the hashing technique which was
used for building directed acyclic graphs for expressions in compiler construction [21].
First, all subtrees are hashed to several buckets, and only subtrees in the same bucket
are compared for equality. This saves a great deal of computation at the expense of
only a little additional storage space. Sometimes two subtrees are almost identical,
except for a few diﬀerences. However, a good hash function would hash them into
two diﬀerent buckets. Baxter et al. denote such clones as near-miss clones. To detect
near-miss clones, an artiﬁcially bad hash function is chosen so that such subtrees are
hashed to the same bucket. Finally, the similarity between two subtrees is calculated
using the following formula:
similairty = 2× S/(2× S + L+R)
where S is the number of shared nodes, L is the number of diﬀerent nodes of the
target subtree, and R is the number of diﬀerent nodes in the reference subtree. If the
calculated similarity is above a speciﬁed threshold, these two subtrees are added to
the clone list.
The second algorithm is the sequence detection algorithm. Based on the Basic
algorithm, the sequence detection algorithm focuses on right- or left-leaning trees with
some kind of identical sequencing operator as a root. To detect these clone sequences,
Baxter et al. leverage the longest common sequence algorithm to compare each pair
of subtrees that contain sequence nodes, to look for maximum length sequences that
encompassed previously detected clones.
After these two algorithms are applied, Baxter et al. begin to visit the parents of
the already-detected clones and to verify whether their parents are near-miss clones.
By doing this, more complex near-miss clones can be detected. In this step, subsumed
clones are also deleted.
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Graph-based approaches
The program dependency graph (PDG) is the most commonly used graph repre-
sentation in source code reuse detection. In PDGs, nodes represent program state-
ments and predicates, and edges represent data and control dependencies. Since the
PDG is a high level abstraction of the original source code, approaches based on PDGs
are normally resilient to multiple changes such as statement reordering or insertion,
as long as such changes do not alter the original dependencies.
Komondoor and Horwitz [49] designed a PDG-based approach to identify source
code clones. The ﬁrst step of their approach is to represent each procedure using
its program dependence graph. All PDG nodes are then partitioned into equivalence
classes based on the syntactic structure of the statement/predicate that the node
represents. For each pair of matching nodes (r1, r2), Komondoor and Horwitz ﬁnd
two isomorphic subgraphs of the PDGs that contain r1 and r2. To this end, they
use two kinds of program slicing [77]: backward slicing and forwarding slicing. Take
backward slicing for example, Komondoor and Horwitz start from r1 and r2 and slice
backwards in lock step. A predecessor and the connecting edge are added to one slice
if and only if there is a corresponding matching predecessor in the other PDG. The
output of the slicing is two isomorphic subgraphs that represent duplicated source
code. After all isomorphic subgraphs have been identiﬁed, Komondoor and Horwitz
conduct post-processing steps, including removing subsumed clones and combining
clones into larger groups. A clone pair (S ′1, S
′
2) subsumes another clone pair (S1, S2)
iﬀ S1 ⊆ S ′1 and S2 ⊆ S ′2. So, given two clone pairs (S ′1, S ′2) and (S1, S2), (S1, S2) will




2). When combining clones into larger
groups, two clone pairs (S1, S2) and (S1, S3) will be combined into one large clone
group (S1, S2, S3).
Liu et al. [55] developed a PDG-based software plagiarism detection tool named
GPLAG. They state that even if the source code has been signiﬁcantly altered, the
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corresponding PDG is nearly invariant. Liu et al. thus address the plagiarism detec-
tion problem through isomorphism testing. To tolerate some extent of noise, instead
of doing exact isomorphism testing, they conduct γ-isomorphism testing by intro-
ducing a relaxation parameter γ (0 < γ ≤ 1). A graph G is γ-isomorphic to G′
if there exists a subgraph S ⊆ G such that S is subgraph isomorphic to G′, and
|S| ≥ γ|G|, γ ∈ (0, 1]. Intuitively, the γ-isomorphism testing becomes exact isomor-
phism testing when γ equals to 1.
Liu et al. also analyzed ﬁve types of alteration techniques that may be applied
during plagiarism: format alteration, identiﬁer renaming, statement reordering, con-
trol replacement, and code insertion. Format alteration involves adding/removing
separators, blanks, or comments into/from the original source code. However, as the
PDG is a high level abstraction of the code, this alteration does not change the PDG.
Identiﬁer renaming is to rename variables, classes, or procedures. Consequently, the
syntax of the corresponding nodes of the original PDG may change, but the struc-
tures remain preserved. Statement reordering is a technique of changing the order
of statements. However, there are normally some dependencies between statements.
Some statements may perform operations on the output of previous statements. As
a result, the order of these statements cannot be switched. On the other hand, re-
ordering two instructions that are not bounded by dependencies will leave the PDG
untouched. Then Liu et al. studied the eﬀect of control replacement on the PDGs as
well, and found that most replacements do not change the PDGs. The only exception
is when a while or for loop is replaced by an inﬁnite loop with a break statement. In
this case, a vertex will be added to the new PDG. However, this added vertex does
not break any existing dependencies. As a result, the original PDG is still an isomor-
phic subgraph of the new PDG. The last type of alteration, code insertion, normally
introduces new vertices or edges into the new PDG. However, the old PDG is still an
isomorphic subgraph of the new PDG, as the introduced vertices or dependencies do
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not change the existing vertices or dependencies in the original PDG.
Relaxed subgraph isomorphism testing is a time-consuming process. In order to
prune the search space, Liu et al. adopt two ﬁlters: a lossless ﬁlter and a lossy ﬁlter.
The lossless ﬁlter has two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, PDGs with a size smaller than a
threshold K will not be checked for isomorphism, as Liu et al. focus only on ﬁnding
non-trivial PDG isomorphism pairs. The second stage is based on the deﬁnition of
γ-isomorphism. Two PDGs g and g′ will not be checked if |g′| < γ|g|, as they cannot
be γ-isomorphic. The second ﬁlter, a lossy ﬁlter, is based on the vertex histogram of
the PDG. Speciﬁcally, a tuple is used to represent each PDG:
h(g) = (n1, n2, ..., nk)
where ni is the frequency of the ith kind of vertex. Two PDGs g and g
′ are checked
for γ-isomorphic only if the similarity between h(g) and h(g′) is above a threshold.
Experiment results suggest that, with the help of these ﬁlters, more than 90% of the
original search space can be pruned.
Krinke [51] proposed a ﬁne-grained PDG-based approach for identifying similar
code. In Krinke’s approach, the traditional PDGs are ﬁrst transformed into ﬁne-
grained PDGs. To this end, vertices are attributed with a class, an operator, and a
value. The class is used to specify the type of vertex, such as statement, expression,
and procedure call. The operator further speciﬁes the type, for example, binary ex-
pression or constant. The value is used to carry the exact operator, constant values,
and identiﬁer names. Krinke also separates the edges into three specialized types:
immediate control edges, value dependence edges, and reference dependence edges.
Immediate control edges denote the control dependence between the components of
an expression, such that the targets of this type of edge are always evaluated prior to
the source. Value dependence edges represent the data ﬂow between the expression
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components. Reference dependence edges are used to denote the assignment of a com-
puted value to a variable. After all vertices and edges in both PDGs are attributed,
Krinke reports the maximal isomorphic subgraphs as duplicated code.
Metrics-based approaches
Metrics-based approaches ﬁrst extract a number of metrics/vectors either from the
source code directly or from other abstractions of the original code, such as abstract
syntax trees. Instead of comparing source code, these metrics/vectors are compared.
These approaches are based on the assumption that if two code fragments are similar,
then the extracted metrics/vectors should be similar as well.
Kontogiannis et al. [50] proposed two techniques for detecting source code clones.
The ﬁrst technique extracts ﬁve well-known metrics from the source code and com-
pares the metric values directly. The second technique leverages a dynamic program-
ming algorithm to ﬁnd the best alignment between two code fragments. Kontogiannis
et al. use the following ﬁve metrics:
• The number of functions called (fanout)
• The ratio of input/output variables to the fanout
• McCabe cyclomatic complexity [60]
• Modiﬁed Albrecht’s function point metric [17]
• Modiﬁed Henry-Kafura’s information ﬂow quality metric [39]
Assuming s is a code fragment, the McCabe cyclomatic complexity can be calcu-
lated as McCabe(s) = 1 + d, where d is the number of control decision predicates in
s, and the modiﬁed Albrecht’s function point metric can be calculated as:
Albrecht(s) =P1 × V ARS USED AND SET (s) + P2 ×GLOBAL V ARS SER(s)+
P3 × USER INPUT (s) + P4 × FILE INPUT (s)
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where P1, P2, P3, and P4 are four weight factors. The modiﬁed Henry-Kafura’s
information ﬂow quality metric is deﬁned as:
Kafura(s) = (KAFURA IN(s)×KAFURA OUT (s))2
where KAFURA IN(s) is the sum of local and global incoming dataﬂow to the code
fragment s and KAFURA OUT (s) is the sum of local and global outgoing dataﬂow
from s.
Mayrand et al. [59] presented a technique for identifying (near) duplicate functions
in a large software system. The source code is ﬁrst transformed into an Abstract
Syntax Tree, which is subsequently transformed into an Intermediate Representation
Language (IRL). For example, the function
int fct (int param)
{
    int ret = 0;
    if (param! = 0)
    {
        fct2();
        ret = 1;
    }
    else
    {
        fct3();
        ret = 2;
    }
    return ret;
}
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The reason behind using IRL is to support multiple source languages. Moreover,
the IRL abstraction carries all of the information required to compute the metrics,
including control ﬂow metrics and data ﬂow metrics.
In total, Mayrand et al. conduct four points of comparison: function name, func-
tion layout, expressions, and function control ﬂow. For function name, the symbolic
names of the functions are compared. For the latter three points, Mayrand et al.
calculate 21 metrics. For instance, for the function layout, they calculate the fol-
lowing ﬁve metrics: volume of declaration comments, volume of control comments,
number of logical comments, number of non-blank lines, and average variable name
length. By using these ﬁve layout metrics, the organization of the source code can be
extracted.
Also, Mayrand et al. use ﬁve metrics to characterize the nature and complexity of
the expressions: total calls to other functions, unique calls to other functions, average
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complexity of decisions, number of declaration statements, and number of executable
statements.
Finally, Mayrand et al. use eleven metrics to capture the structure information
of the control ﬂow graph (e.g., number of decisions, number of independent paths,
average decision span, etc.). When comparing two functions, Mayrand et al. ﬁrst
specify a delta threshold for each metric. Two functions are reported as similar if the
absolute diﬀerence for each metric is less than or equal to the delta threshold deﬁned
for the corresponding metric.
2.2 Binary Code Reuse Detection
Text-based approaches
Text-based approaches consider the binary code as a sequence of bytes and com-
pare the byte sequence directly.
In [40] Jang and Brumley proposed BitShred, which can identify shared code. Bit-
Shred consists of three phases: shredding a ﬁle, creating a ﬁngerprint, and comparing
ﬁngerprints.
First, each given binary is disassembled. Once all executable code sections are
identiﬁed, these sections are then divided into fragments denoted as shreds. Each
shred is essentially a contiguous byte sequence of length n. The length must be
appropriate to achieve a trade-oﬀ between accuracy and resistance to code reordering.
An example of shredding when n = 5 is shown in Figure 3.
To improve scalability, a Bloom ﬁlter [23] is leveraged to create a ﬁngerprint for
each binary ﬁle. The Bloom ﬁlter is a data structure for set membership tests. It
consists of a bit array of m bits and k diﬀerent hash functions. To add an element to
the Bloom ﬁlter, k hash functions are applied to the element, and the corresponding
bits in the bit array are set to 1. For each binary ﬁle, all of the shreds are added to
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53 8a 5c 24 08 56 24 08 56 24 08 8a 5c 24 08 56
(a) Given byte sequence
538a5c2408 8a5c240856 5c24085624 2408562408
0856240856 5624085624 2408562408 085624088a
5624088a5c 24088a5c24 088a5c2408 8a5c240856
(b) Derived shreds with size 5
Figure 3: An example of shredding a byte sequence when n = 5 (Jang and Brumley
[40])
a Bloom ﬁlter which is then considered as the ﬁngerprint of the binary ﬁle.
Jang and Brumley use the Jaccard index to measure the similarity between two
ﬁles. The Jaccard index is deﬁned as the size of the intersection divided by the
size of the union of two sets [10]. However, instead of comparing two ﬁles directly,
their ﬁngerprints are compared. More speciﬁcally, Jang and Brumley use JR(A,B)




where S(BF ) returns the number of set bits of the Bloom ﬁlter BF . They also deﬁne




where S(BFA) > S(BFB). Finally, during clustering, a similarity threshold t is
deﬁned, and two ﬁles with a similarity above t would be grouped into the same
cluster.
The main problem of BitShred is that it is too coarse. Considering only the
shreds of byte sequences leads to signiﬁcant loss of information. Furthermore, the
byte sequences are by no means stable, and could easily be changed across diﬀerent
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binaries even when compiled from the same source code base. As a result, it is not
applicable to binary code reuse detection.
FCatalog [7] is also a text-based approach for ﬁnding similarities between binary
functions. FCatalog ﬁrst applies k-gram analysis on the binary code to generate fea-
ture sets. Minhashing [18] is then used to convert these sets into minhash signatures
of constant size. When comparing two functions, FCatalog compares their minhash
signatures.
K-gram/K-perm-based approaches
Myles and Collberg [64] proposed to use opcode level k-gram as birthmarks of
software. A k-gram is a contiguous substring of length k which can be letters, words,
or in their approach, opcodes. Suppose f(p) and f(q) are two sets of k-gram birth-
marks extracted from the sets of modules p and q respectively. The similarity between




Myles and Collberg also found that increases in the value of k result in increases in
credibility, but decreases in resilience. Consequently, they claim that k = 4 or 5 is
appropriate to achieve an acceptable trade-oﬀ between credibility and resilience.
An alternative to using k-gram is to use k-perm. In [44] Karim et al. used k-
perm to generate phylogeny for malware. For a sequence of k characters, k-perm
represents every possible permutation of that sequence. As a result, the order of
characters within k-perm is irrelevant for matching purposes. Using k-perm results
in the advantage of better matching of permutations of code, especially when the
instructions are not in the same order. During experiments, Karim et al. found
that using k-perm produces higher similarity scores for permuted programs. The
drawback is that, for the same program, using k-perm would generates less k-perms
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than using k-gram. This loss of information might aﬀect accuracy. Furthermore,
apart from code reordering, there are many evolution techniques, such as instruction
substitution, insertion, and deletion. Using k-perm could not track evolution in the
presence of such techniques.
Metrics-based approaches
Inspired by the source code reuse detection work in [41], Sæbjørnsen et al. [72]
proposed a practical binary code clone detection framework.
The ﬁrst step of their approach is to disassemble the input binaries and extract
the assembly code. The assembly code is then split into code regions using a sliding
window. To allow some “fuzziness”, the instructions of all code regions are normal-
ized. Speciﬁcally, the mnemonics of the instructions are kept untouched, and the
operands are normalized into three categories: MEM, REG, and VAL, representing
memory references, registers, and constant values, respectively.
Sæbjørnsen et al. also deﬁned two types of clone pairs: exact clone pairs and
inexact clone pairs. Two code regions with identical normalized instruction sequences
are considered as an exact clone pair. For inexact clone pairs, a similarity threshold
is deﬁned, and code regions with a similarity above this threshold are considered as
inexact clone pairs.
For exact clone detection, in order to avoid pairwise comparisons of all code re-
gions, a hashing mechanism is used to generate a ﬁngerprint for each code region and
two code regions with identical hash value are considered as a clone pair.
To detect inexact clones, Sæbjørnsen et al. extract some features from each code
region and construct a feature vector from that. In total, the following ﬁve groups of
features are extracted:
• M : Each distinct mnemonic
• OPTYPE : Each operand type
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• M × OPTYPE : Each combination of the mnemonic and the type of the ﬁrst
operand
• OPTYPE × OPTYPE : The types of the ﬁrst and second operands
• OPTYPE × Nk: Each normalized operand and its index
The vectors are generated based on the number of occurrences of each feature
within a code region. Subsequently, locality-sensitive hashing [18] is applied on all
the feature vectors, such that similar feature vectors (code regions) are hashed into
the same bucket. Then the code regions whose feature vectors are in the same bucket
are considered as clone pairs. Finally, before reporting the found clone clusters, trivial
clones are removed and overlapping clone pairs are merged.
Based on the framework proposed by Sæbjørnsen et al. [72], Farhadi et al. [34]
designed an assembly code clone detection system named BinClone. Compared with
the work in [72], BinClone can provide deterministic results and achieve better recall
rates, which is of great importance in malware reverse engineering.
Similar to what Sæbjørnsen et al. do in [72], Farhadi et al. also ﬁrst disassemble
the binary code into assembly code, and use a sliding window to split the assembly
code into code regions. During normalization, unlike Sæbjørnsen et al. who only
normalize the operands into three categories MEM, REG, and VAL, Farhadi et al.
use a more ﬁne-grained approach with diﬀerent levels of hierarchy. In Farhadi et al.’s
approach, operands are ﬁrst normalized to three categories MEM, REG, and VAL.
The REG category is further normalized into 3 groups: General Registers (e.g., EAX,
EBX), Segment Registers (e.g., CS, DS), and Index and Pointer Registers (e.g., ESI,
EDI). Finally, the General Registers group is broken down by size into three groups:
32-bit registers (e.g., EAX), 16-bit registers (e.g., AX, BX), and 8-bit registers (e.g.,
AH, BL).
For exact clone detection, Farhadi et al. use a similar hashing mechanism as used
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by Sæbjørnsen et al.
For inexact clone detection, Farhadi et al. proposed two methods, a sequential
feature selection method and a two-combination method. The sequential feature
selection method ﬁrst computes the median of each feature on all regions and ﬁlters
out features whose median equals to 0. A binary vector is then generated for each
region by comparing the feature vector of the region with the median vector. Then the
binary vector is partitioned into sub-vectors which are hashed into diﬀerent buckets.
By keeping track of the frequency of region co-occurrences of all buckets, inexact
clones are identiﬁed.
The two-combination method is similar to the sequential feature selection method.
However, the two-combination method considers all possible two-combinations of fea-
tures when generating sub-vectors. Consequently, the set of sub-vectors generated by
the sequential feature selection method is a subset of the sub-vectors generated by
the two-combination method. As a result, the two-combination method has a better
recall rate. However, there is a trade-oﬀ of lower performance of scalability than the
sequential feature selection method.
The problem is, their approach does not take the structure of assembly function
into account. Instead, it partitions each function into multiple code regions and
matches these code regions. As a result, the precision is a problem.
In [25] Bruschi et al. proposed a novel metric-based approach for detecting self-
mutating malware. Virus writers may reuse code when creating malware. In order
to evade anti-virus products, they may introduce various mutation techniques, such
as instruction substitution, instruction permutation, dead code insertion, variable
substitution, and control ﬂow alteration.
To overcome these evasion techniques, Bruschi et al. propose to ﬁrst normalize
the code to a canonical form, which is suitable for comparison, and to then compare
the normalized code. The following normalization techniques are used:
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• Instruction meta-representation: This is a high level representation of the se-
mantics of the original machine instructions. All side eﬀects on registers, mem-
ory, and control ﬂags are recorded in this representation. For example, “pop
eax” will be translated into “r10 = [r11]; r11 = r11 + 4”.
• Propagation: This is used to propagate forward values assigned or computed by
intermediate instructions. Once an instruction deﬁnes a value, its occurrences
would be replaced with the value computed by the deﬁning instruction, if sub-
sequent instructions did not redeﬁne it. By doing this, all temporary variables
can be eliminated and higher level expressions can be generated.
• Dead code elimination: This technique removes instructions whose results are
never used.
• Algebraic simpliﬁcation: This simpliﬁes expressions according to ordinary alge-
braic rules.
• Control ﬂow graph compression: This technique analyzes inserted fake condi-
tional and unconditional jumps. If the condition of a jump always evaluates to
true or false, which means that the underlying path will never be accessed, then
all the paths originating from it should be removed.
After all the codes have been normalized, Bruschi et al. begin to compare them
and measure the similarity between them. To do this, the approach proposed by
Kontogiannis et al. [50] is adopted. More speciﬁcally, every control ﬂow graph is
encoded into a 7-vector using the metrics shown in Table 1:
For each given code fragment, a 7-vector (m1,m2,m3,m4,m5,m6,m7) is generated
as its ﬁngerprint. To compare two code fragments a and b, the Euclidean distance
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Metrics for encoding a control ﬂow graph into a vector
m1: number of nodes in the control ﬂow graph
m2: number of edges in the control ﬂow graph
m3: number of direct calls
m4: number of indirect calls
m5: number of direct jumps
m6: number of indirect jumps
m7: number of conditional jumps
Table 1: Metrics (Bruschi et al. [25] )




where mi,a and mi,b are the i
th metric calculated on fragments a and b, respectively.
Bruschi et al. also deﬁne a threshold, and if the calculated distance is below this
threshold, these code fragments are considered equivalent.
Structure-based approaches
Flake [35] and its extension proposed by Dullien and Bochum [32] presented a pi-
oneer work of structure-based comparison approach. Their work aimed at comparing
two diﬀerent but similar executables. The whole approach is based on the observation
that the call graph of an executable stays largely the same, even when compiled in
diﬀerent compilation environments. They also introduced a novel way of comparing
two basic blocks, namely small prime product (SPP), which is resilient to instruction
reordering.
The SPP algorithm works as follows. First, a unique small prime number is
assigned to each distinct mnemonic based on an arbitrary but deterministic order.
Since every basic block can be looked at as a sequence of instructions, then the
product of all corresponding primes based on the mnemonics of consisting instructions
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is calculated. If two basic blocks have an identical product, they must have the same
set of mnemonics, though not necessarily in the same order due to the uniqueness of
prime decompositions and the fact that multiplication is commutative. For real-world
applications, this product is truncated (module 264). Dullien and Bochum also proved
that this truncation is safe for a sequence shorter than 14 elements with an alphabet
of 100 elements. Naturally, this SPP can also be applied to compare two functions as
well.
Given two executables, the call graphs of both executables are ﬁrst constructed,
followed by the generation of control ﬂow graphs for all functions of both executables.
Note that each node in the call graph is essentially a function that can be replaced by
its control ﬂow graph. Dullien and Bochum operate ﬁrst on call graphs. More specif-
ically, they generate a number of “ﬁxedpoints” in the call graphs of both executables
by selecting node (function) pairs that meet the following criteria:
• K-indegree nodes / k-outdegree nodes: Selecting functions whose indegree or
outdegree is exactly k
• Recursive nodes: Selecting functions that invoke themselves
• Same name: Selecting functions with the same symbolic name
• Same string reference: Selecting functions that contain code referring to the
same string
• Same SPP: Selecting functions that have the same prime product
A 3-tuple is also assigned to each node (function) representing three extracted
features: the number of basic blocks in the function, the number of edges linking
them to form the control ﬂow graph, and the number of subfunction calls in all
consisting basic blocks of that function. This 3-tuple is then considered as a feature
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vector. When comparing two nodes, the Euclidean distance between their feature
vectors is calculated.
After the initial ﬁxedpoints have been generated, Dullien and Bochum continue
to explore their successors and predecessors to expand these ﬁxedpoints. Given an
unmatched node in one executable, the node with the minimal distance from the
other executable is chosen. If multiple nodes with the same minimal distance to that





a if ∃a∈A∀b∈A,b =a|x− a| < |x− b|
0, Otherwise
After all ﬁxedpoints are generated, the output is a (partial) mapping of functions
in both executables. For each matched function pair, Dullien and Bochum begin
to work on their control ﬂow graphs in the same manner as in call graphs. The
ﬁxedpoints in control ﬂow graphs are generated using the following criteria:
• K-indegree nodes / k-outdegree nodes: Selecting basic blocks that have the
same number of predecessors or successors
• Recursive nodes: Selecting basic blocks that may jump back to their beginning
• Same string reference: Selecting basic blocks that contain code referring to the
same string
• Same SPP: Selecting basic blocks that have the same prime product
• Same subfunction call: Selecting basic blocks that contain calls to the same
subfunction
The output of the control ﬂow analysis is a (partial) mapping of basic blocks of
every matched function pair. Once all the matchings have been generated, every
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instruction in a basic block is then treated as a node and every basic block is treated
as a special simple form of graph, and again, the same algorithm used on call graphs
and control ﬂow graphs is applied on basic blocks.
Dullien and Bochum applied their approach on two well-known trojans: Bagle.X
and Bagle.W [2]. A thorough analysis of Bagle.X had already been conducted, with
every function properly named and commented. By using their approach on both the
new found Bagle.W and already analyzed Bagle.X, Dullien and Bochum successfully
associate all but 6 functions of Bagle.W with their counterpart in Bagle.X. As a
result, human analysts have only to focus on these 6 unmatched functions, which
greatly saves the analysts both eﬀort and time.
Despite encouraging results, the largest shortcoming of this approach is that it
is doing exact matching, instead of fuzzy matching. For example, when generating
ﬁxedpoints for control ﬂow graphs or for call graphs, this approach requires two nodes
to have the same in-degree or out-degree. In addition, the same SPP requires two basic
blocks (or functions) to have exactly the same set of mnemonics, which do not always
hold true even for a true match. These requirements are overly strict, especially
for executables compiled in diﬀerent compilation environments. As a result, this
approach is only suitable for comparing the same executable, from the same source
code base, and compiled in the same compilation environment, which greatly limits
its usefulness.
BinDiﬀ [3], developed by the Zynamics company, is the de facto standard com-
mercial tool for comparing binary ﬁles. The intention of BinDiﬀ is to compare two
related and similar, but diﬀerent executables, and to identify identical or similar func-
tions among them. One advantage of BinDiﬀ is that it is applicable across various
platforms. Analysts can apply BinDiﬀ on binary ﬁles from diﬀerent platforms, such
as x86, MIPS, ARM, and PowerPC. The changed (unmatched) functions and basic
blocks are displayed in an easy to understand way.
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In [31], Dullien et al. presented some results on executable code comparison for
attacker correlation. After a successful attack has taken place, the only thing left
for defenders to analyze is the malicious code obtained from compromised systems.
Dullien et al. thus focus their analysis on the structural features, such as the call graph
and control ﬂow graph, of the malicious code. Since using pairwise comparisons to
compare one piece of malicious code with a large repository of code does not scale
well, Dullien et al. designed a way to encode the control ﬂow graph into a sequence of
bits to allow fast querying into large sets of data. To do this, every edge in a control
ﬂow graph is ﬁrst converted into an n-tuple of integers using the following function:
















where G is the set of all control ﬂow graphs and Eg is the set of edges of a particular
G belonging to G. Next, each 5-tuple is converted into a real number as follows:













where t ∈ tup(g).
Dullien et al. also designed an algorithm that operates at both call graph and
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control ﬂow graph levels, to construct an approximation of the maximum subgraph
isomorphism. The algorithm attempts to match nodes and edges based on the fol-
lowing characteristics:
• Bytes Hash: A traditional hash over the bytes of the function or basic block
• MD-Index of a particular function, which is the MD-Index of the underlying
function of the given node
• MD-Index of the source and destination of edges of the call graph, which is a
tuple consisting of the MD-Index of the source node and destination node
• MD-Index of the graph neighborhood of a node/edge, which is the MD-Index of
a subgraph containing the given node/edge, extracted from the original graph
• Small Prime Product, which is a simple way of comparing the mnemonics of a
basic block or function [32]
Figure 4: System architecture (Dullien et al. [31])
Figure 4 depicts the overall system architecture. The central part is an SQL database
from which multiple components fetch data. In total, there are four components:
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• Unpacker. This component attempts to remove the encryption by emulating the
executable and monitoring the statistical properties of the system RAM. Once
the entropy of memory drops, the component assumes that the encryption was
removed.
• Disassembly. This component disassembles the memory dump from the Un-
packer and extracts call graphs and control ﬂow graphs.
• Scheduler. The Scheduler conducts a rough comparison based on the MD-
Indices of the functions in the disassembly and obtains a subset of promising
executables for later comparison.
• Comparison. This component performs the comparison and writes the results
back to the database.
Kruegel et al. [53] presented a novel technique based on structural analysis to
detect polymorphic worms. Polymorphic worms are able to change their code while
spreading. To detect such kind of worms, ﬁrst control ﬂow graphs are constructed
from the network stream. Then, k-subgraphs are generated from the control ﬂow
graphs. To do this more eﬃciently, a depth-ﬁrst traversal is conducted on each basic
block b to ﬁrst generate the spanning tree. Once the spanning tree is constructed, all
possible k-node subtrees are generated with basic block b as the root node. To ease the
comparison of two subgraphs, canonical graph labeling [19] is leveraged to transform
every subgraph into its canonical representation so that two subgraphs with identical
canonical forms are isomorphisms. To overcome the limitation of considering only the
structure, every basic block is assigned a color based on the instructions, to encode
the functionality of that basic block. The color value used by Kruegel et al. is 14-bit.
Correspondingly the assembly instructions are classiﬁed into 14 categories and each
bit in the color value represents the presence of a certain category of instructions. The
Nauty library [61] is then used to take the color into consideration when canonicalizing
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a subgraph. By combining the structural analysis and graph coloring techniques, the
high-level structure of a polymorphic worm is captured.
In [24], Bruschi et al. proposed an approach for malicious code detection. Given
a malicious code M and a program P , Bruschi et al. ﬁrst collect information from P
by conducting control ﬂow and data ﬂow analysis. This information is then used to
normalize the program to PN , after which the control ﬂow graphs for the malicious
code and PN are generated. To augment these control ﬂow graphs, labeling (coloring)
is applied to both nodes and edges based on instruction classes and ﬂow transition
classes, respectively. Bruschi et al. label nodes in a manner very similar to the
work proposed in [53], but with fewer instruction classes. Subsequently, a subgraph
isomorphism algorithm, VF2 [27], is applied on the labeled control ﬂow graphs. The
corresponding isomorphism in PN is then reported as an instance of the malicious
code, as depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Malicious code M and normalized program PN , respectively. The high-
lighted nodes are the matching nodes in PN (Bruschi et al. [24])
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Semantic-based approaches
The semantic-based approach bases its analysis on the semantics of the binary
code. In the case of binary code reuse detection, semantics often refer to the input-
behavior and output-behavior of the binary code. Semantic-based approaches are
often combined with structural analysis or with clustering methods from machine
learning.
BinHunt [36], proposed by Gao et al., is the ﬁrst work that combines symbolic
execution and theorem proving to perform binary code similarity comparison. Figure
6 depicts the overall architecture of BinHunt. Given two binary ﬁles, the ﬁrst step is
to disassemble both ﬁles. In their implementation, a commercial disassembler, IDA
Pro [9], is used. Note that Gao et al. use IDA Pro only to obtain a sequence of
x86 instructions; they do not rely on it to generate the control ﬂow graph. Subse-
quently, all x86 instructions are fed to a converter, and the output is an intermediate
representation (IR) of the original x86 instructions. This IR is far simpler than the
original instruction set. It consists of roughly a dozen diﬀerent statements that are
type-checked and free of side eﬀects. The generated IR is then fed into a control
ﬂow graph constructor to generate the control ﬂow graph for each function as well
as the call graph for each binary. The control ﬂow graph of an assembly function is
a directed graph, where nodes represent basic blocks and edges represent the execu-
tion ﬂow between basic blocks. To compare two control ﬂow graphs, Gao et al. ﬁrst
introduce a way to compare their nodes (basic blocks) in terms of semantics.
Figure 6: Overall architecture of BinHunt (Gao et al. [36])
35
For every basic block, Gao et al. ﬁrst ﬁnd all input and output registers and
variables from the IR representation. Then, symbolic execution [48] is used to obtain
the ﬁnal values of all output registers and variables. After that, a theorem prover is
applied to test if two basic blocks have the same output registers and variables. Gao et
al. claim that two basic blocks are functionally equivalent if there is a permutation of
all the registers and variables between the two basic blocks such that all the matched
registers and variables contain the same value. A matching strength is also assigned
to every matching basic block pair to denote the similarity of the two basic blocks in
terms of functionality.
Guided by this matching strength, subgraph isomorphism analysis is conducted.
More speciﬁcally, when comparing two functions, the backtracking [75, 52] algorithm
is used to ﬁnd the maximum common subgraph of the control ﬂow graphs of these
two functions. The backtracking algorithm keeps the best match found so far and
replaces erroneous matches with a better one until the best one has been found. The
output is four fold, namely the (partial) matching between functions, the (partial)
matching between basic blocks for matched functions and the matching strengths for
matched functions and basic blocks.
To demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of BinHunt, Gao et al. applied BinHunt on three
use cases. The ﬁrst use case corresponds to a buﬀer overﬂow vulnerability in gzip.
By comparing both the patch and unpatched version of gzip, BinHunt successfully
identiﬁed the function where the patch took place. Gao et al. also conducted experi-
ments on other executables such as tar and Microsoft.NET framework 2.0 (ASP.NET),
and successfully identiﬁed these functions whose functionality has been changed.
Despite encouraging results, BinHunt is not without drawbacks. The ﬁrst problem
is that using graph isomorphism to detect similar binary code is overly strict and is not
suitable for practical use. Its usefulness is severely limited by the fact that compilers
may bring mutations or noise to the control ﬂow structure. As a result, BinHunt
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is only suitable for analyzing two versions of the same binary compiled by the same
compiler in the same compilation environment. Second, BinHunt focuses its analysis
on x86 executables, as the used IR converter does not support x64 or other platforms.
Third, symbolic execution, theorem proving, and graph isomorphism detection are
all time-consuming. For example, during graph isomorphism, a timeout must be
introduced for function pairs in which the backtracking algorithm did not return in
a timely fashion and no results will be returned in such case. It is thus not suitable
for large-scale code reuse detection.
Recently proposed by Ng and Prakash [65], Expose´ is a tool for identifying library
code reuse in applications. It combines symbolic execution using theorem proving
with k-gram at the function level to achieve a trade-oﬀ between performance and
accuracy. To do this, Expose´ divides the functions of an application into two sets
based on numerous criteria. Symbolic execution [48] is then performed on one set,
while k-gram analysis is performed on the other.
The ﬁrst step is pre-ﬁltering, during which loader support functions are excluded.
Expose´ also excludes functions that are improbable for semantic equivalence checking
by only selecting functions with the following criteria:
• Has the same number of input arguments as the target library function.
• Has the same out-degree as the target library function.
• With a cyclomatic complexity of less than 15.
• With a function size of less than 300 bytes.
These criteria are required due to the fact that checking semantic equivalence
using symbolic execution is very expensive. Excluding functions that are unlikely to
be matched or are too expensive to match could speed up the process.
Expose´ also maintains two sets, an IS-pairs set and a MAY-pairs set. If two func-
tions from the library and executable respectively are semantically equivalent, Expose´
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places them into the IS-pairs set. For functions that are improbable for semantic
equivalence checking, k-gram analysis is applied. First, a feature vector is generated
for each function. Then, to compare two functions, the cosine distance [4] between
the feature vectors of these two functions is calculated. After that, Expose´ biases the
original cosine distance following a specially crafted score strategy. For example, if
two functions have diﬀerent out-degrees, Expose´ increases the cosine distance by 0.1,
and if they have the same number of non-zero input parameters, Expose´ decreases
the distance by 0.2. Ng and Prakash claim that the values used for biasing work well
in their experiments. Then, for every library function, Expose´ selects ﬁve functions
with the smallest biased cosine distance from the application, and places them in the
MAY-pairs set.
Once all IS-pairs and MAY-pairs have been obtained, Expose´ uses the Hungarian
algorithm [54] to ﬁnd the best localized mapping of functions between the library
and the application. The ﬁnal distance score between the library and the application
is the average of the biased cosine distance of the pairs returned by the localized
Hungarian algorithm. The smaller the score, the more likely the application contains
the code of that library.
Ng and Prakash conducted two experiments to evaluate Expose´. In the ﬁrst
experiment, given the library libpng and an application known to contain the code
of libpng, Expose´ correctly ranked the application as #1 out of 128 applications. In
the second experiment, using zlib as the target library, Expose´ successfully identiﬁed
10 applications that are known to contain the target library from an assortment of
2,927 applications.
Since Expose´ aims to rank applications based on the likelihood of containing the
target library code, the features it uses, such as k-gram, are very coarse and are
not suitable to accurately compare two binary functions. Moreover, if an application
reuses part of the library’s code, Expose´ may fail to detect this kind of partial code
38
reuse.
More recently, Pewny et al. proposed TEDEM [67], which is a binary code reuse
detection system which can identify the buggy function from a set of reference func-
tions. Unlike previous works which leverage theorem proving, Pewny et al. designed
a novel way of comparing code regions semantically by leveraging tree edit distance.
Similar to most existing works, the ﬁrst step is to disassemble the buggy function
and all reference functions and to generate the control ﬂow graph with nodes repre-
senting basic blocks. However, each basic block is further split into strict basic blocks
at function calls. Pewny et al. argue that the instruction following a call is actually
an implicit target of a return instruction, and thus should be the ﬁrst instruction of
a strict basic block.
imul edx, 4
imul ebx, 2
add  esi, edx
mov eax, [esi]
add  eax, ebx
eax := Ind(4, esi + edx * 4) + ebx * 2
edx := 4 *edx
ebx := 2 * ebx
esi  := esi + 4*edx
strict basic block basic block semantics
Figure 7: Exemplary strict basic block and its semantic equations, where Ind(x, y)
refers to the x-byte value at address y
After all (strict) basic blocks have been obtained, Pewny et al. use METASM [37]
to extract the semantics of each basic block. METASM, written in Ruby, is capable
of executing or accumulating assembly instructions. The output of the execution is a
list of equations which represent the eﬀect of the execution on registers, memory, or
branch conditions. Figure 7 shows an example of a strict basic block and its semantic
equations extracted by METASM. Subsequently, all semantic equations are converted
into S-Expressions. For example, the S-Expression of the ﬁrst equation in Figure 7
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would be:
(:= eax (+ (Ind 4 (+ esi (∗ edx 4))) (∗ ebx 2 ))).
Since the S-Expression is a notation for tree-like data structures, every equation is
then represented by a tree, such that the root node is an assignment, the leaf nodes
are registers or constants, and the intermediate nodes are operations. To compare
two basic blocks, Pewny et al. ﬁrst transform all semantic equations of both basic
blocks into trees, and then use the tree edit distance (TED) to measure the distance
of these two basic blocks. To this end, the tree edit distance algorithm proposed by
Tekli et al. [74] is adopted. Pewny et al. choose this algorithm speciﬁcally for its
ability to support subtree-edits. An example is shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Exemplary tree edit distance with subtree-edits (Pewny et al. [67])
Basic block comparison using TED is the cornerstone of their approach. However,
comparing basic blocks using TED does not scale well. To address this problem, given
a target buggy function, Pewny et al. ﬁrst use coarse-grained basic block features to
ﬁnd a small set of candidate basic blocks from the reference functions. The features
they use include the number of equations, the depth of the equation trees, and the
number of nodes in the tree. This small set is then used as a set of starting points.
Then, for every starting point, Pewny et al. use the ﬁne-grained feature, namely
TED, to further select 20 basic blocks with the smallest tree edit distance from the
reference functions as matching candidates.
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For every starting point and each of its 20 matching candidates, Pewny et al. con-
duct neighborhood exploration in both the buggy function and the reference function
based on their control ﬂow graphs. Each time, newly matched basic block pairs will
be used to expand the existing mapping. The exploration terminates when no further
neighbors can be explored. Pewny et al. conduct this for each matching candidate of
each starting point. The ﬁnal distance is the smallest sum of tree edit distances of
all the matching basic block pairs found so far. The smaller the distance, the more
similar the reference function is to the buggy function.
The largest limitation of this approach is performance. Recall that for every basic
block in the set of starting points, 20 matching basic blocks must be found using
tree edit distance. It is thus not suitable for code reuse detection in large data sets.
Moreover, this approach must conduct neighborhood exploration multiple times and
each time it starts exploration from only one pair of basic blocks. As a result, the
quality of the mapping found by this approach might not be good.
Behavioral-based approaches
Comparetti et al. [26] developed a system named REANIMATOR which can de-
termine the capabilities of malware programs by dynamically executing the malware
and simultaneously observing its behavior. When malicious actions are observed dur-
ing dynamic execution, Comparetti et al. extract and model the parts of the malware
binary that caused this behavior. These models are then used to check whether sim-
ilar code is present in other malware samples. Their system consists of three phases:
dynamic behavior identiﬁcation, extracting genotype models, and ﬁnding dormant
functionality. In the dynamic behavior identiﬁcation phase, a dynamic execution
sandbox, Anubis [1], is leveraged to execute the given malware binary and to record
all invocations of security-relevant system calls and Windows API functions. In the
second phase, the part of the binary responsible for certain behavior is located and
modeled. Finally, all the models built in the previous phase are used to check other
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binaries for dormant functionality.
In [73], Shankarapani et al. proposed two methods, Static Analyzer for Vicious
Executables (SAVE) and Malware Examiner using Disassembled Code, for malicious
code detection. The ﬁrst method, SAVE, focuses on behaviors of API calls (e.g., static
API call sequence and static API call set) for analysis, whereas the second method
focuses analysis on assembly calls of the code.
Hybrid detection approaches
In [47], Khoo et al. built a search engine for binary code in which they com-
bined ﬁve diﬀerent abstraction techniques: instruction mnemonic k-grams, instruc-
tion mnemonic k-perms, control ﬂow subgraph, extended control ﬂow subgraph, and
data constants. Khoo et al. ﬁrst generate mnemonic k-grams [64] from a given piece
of binary code. Since the mnemonic k-grams are not resilient to instruction reorder-
ing, mnemonic k-perms [44] are combined together with k-grams. To capture control
ﬂow structure information, Khoo et al. ﬁrst break the control ﬂow graph into sev-
eral small k-subgraphs, and then use graph canonicalization [61] to transform each
k-subgraph into a k2-bit number in order to ease the comparison of graphs. To ad-
dress the shortcoming of low uniqueness of k-subgraphs, Khoo et al. propose to use
extended control ﬂow subgraph by introducing a virtual external node. Finally, two
types of data constants, integers and strings, are extracted from the binary code.
Lastly, Wang et al. [76] presented a tool called BMAT, which can match two
versions of a binary program without knowledge of source code changes. The intention
is to propagate the proﬁle information from an old build to a newer build, and thus,
save the time of re-proﬁling.
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2.3 Summary
We have presented diﬀerent approaches for both source code reuse detection and
binary code reuse detection. Unlike the source code, the binary code is essentially
a sequence of assembly instructions with mnemonics, various registers and memory
references. All these mnemonics, diﬀerent registers and memory references are very
abstract, and do not preserve much information from the source. Consequently, these
source code reuse detection techniques cannot be applied to binary code reuse de-
tection. On the other hand, existing binary code reuse detection techniques are not
without their limitations. For example, these text-based approaches are too coarse,
and are not suitable for function level binary code reuse detection; the metrics-based
approaches normally can handle a large collection of code, but the precision is a prob-
lem as diﬀerent code might have identical or similar feature vectors. Structure-based
approaches take the control ﬂow graph or the call graph into consideration; however,
it is relatively expensive to compare two graphs especially for large graphs. Com-
pared with other techniques, semantic-based approaches can achieve better accuracy.
However, using semantics to compare binary code is expensive and overly strict. We




The problem we are trying to solve can be described as follows: Given one target
binary function from one executable, and a large repository with thousands or mil-
lions of functions from other executables, how to identify all the identical or similar
functions from the repository. This problem is two-fold. First, how to compare two
assembly functions and obtain a similarity score. Second, how to eﬃciently retrieve
those ones that are likely to be identical or similar to our target function and at the
same time, avoid pairwise comparison of each function pair.
In this work, we establish the similarity of two functions by comparing their control
ﬂow graphs (CFGs). The CFG of an assembly function is a directed graph, where
nodes represent basic blocks, and edges represent the execution ﬂow between basic
blocks.
The compiler is responsible for transforming the source code into assembly code.
Take C++ for example, generally speaking there are four types of control structures:
• Sequential control structure
• Selection control structure (e.g., if, if-else or switch statement)
• Iteration control structure (e.g., for, while or do-while loop)
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• Goto structure
Normally the sequential control structure will not bring additional edges or branches
into the control ﬂow graph, while the later three structures would. Figure 9 shows
some typical examples of these structures and their corresponding CFGs. Note that
as these structures can be nested in source code, so do their corresponding CFGs.
Figure 10 depicts two examples of nested control structures.
if(expr)
{
    statement1;
else











    statement1;
    break;
case two:
    statement2;
    break;
default:
    statement3;











(b) The “switch” structure
for( ;expr; )
{















(d) The “goto” statement
Figure 9: Examples of control structures and corresponding CFGs
Although diﬀerent compilation environments would bring some mutations or “noise”
into the CFGs, still the overall structure is relatively stable. As can be seen from
Figure 9, the mapping between source code statements and basic blocks is stable as
well.




    if(expr)
    {
        statement1_1;
    }
    else
    {
        statement1_2;
    }
else










(a) The nested “if-else” structure
for( ;expr; )
{
    for( ;expr; )
    {
        statement;









(b) The nested “for” loop structure
Figure 10: Examples of nested control structures and corresponding CFGs
comparing two functions. We ﬁrst ﬁnd the mapping of basic blocks between these
two functions and then for every matching basic block pair, we obtain a matching
score using the concept of longest common subsequence. Finally, we calculate the
similarity score of two functions from the matching results of the basic blocks.
Since pairwise comparison is not eﬃcient, we choose to apply a ﬁltering process
before the actual comparison. Given a target function, instead of comparing it with
every function in the repository, we choose to ﬁrst obtain a subset of promising
functions using the ﬁltering process and then pairwise compare the target with every
function in this subset.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, the overall design and work-
ﬂow of our approach is presented in Section 3.1. Then we introduce every step of the
algorithm we use to compare two functions, namely disassembly and normalization
(Section 3.2), instruction comparison (Section 3.3), basic block comparison (Section
3.4), longest path generation (Section 3.5), path exploration (Section 3.6) and neigh-
borhood exploration (Section 3.7). In Section 3.8 we introduce the detailed design of

















Longest Path Generation Path Expl. Neighborhood Expl.
Ranking
Figure 11: Workﬂow of BinSequence
Figure 11 depicts the workﬂow of BinSequence. First, a collection of interesting
binaries such as previously analyzed malware or open source software that may have
been reused, is disassembled. The output is a set of functions. We then keep all the
functions in a large repository after normalizing them. Given a target function, we
can compare it with every function in the repository and rank the results. However,
this is not eﬃcient as most of the functions in the repository are not similar to our
target and should thus not be compared. To speed up the process, we focus only
on those functions that are likely to be similar with our target. To this end, we
adopt a ﬁltering process in which we use two ﬁlters. The ﬁrst ﬁlter is based on
the number of basic blocks, while the second is based on the similarity of feature
sets that we extracted as ﬁngerprints for every function. The output of the ﬁltering
process is a subset of functions from the repository, which we call the candidate set.
We then perform pairwise comparisons of the target function with every function in
the candidate set. The comparison consists of three phases. First, we generate the
47
longest path of the target function. Then we explore the reference function in the
candidate set to ﬁnd the corresponding matching path, from which we can obtain the
initial mapping of basic blocks. We then improve the mapping through neighborhood
exploration in both the target and reference functions. The output is the mapping of
basic blocks and the similarity score of these two functions. After we have done this
to every function in the candidate set, we obtain a ranking of functions based on the
similarity score.
3.2 Disassembly and Normalization
Given a collection of binaries, the ﬁrst step is to disassemble each binary to a set of
functions. In our experiments, we use IDA Pro [9] to generate the control ﬂow graph
for every function. Since the compiler has many choices with regard to mnemonics,
registers and memory allocations when generating the assembly code, it is essential
that every assembly instruction in the basic block is normalized before comparison
[72].
Note that an assembly instruction consists of a mnemonic and a sequence of up to
3 operands. When normalizing instructions, we keep the mnemonics untouched, and
only normalize the operands. We classify the operands into three categories, namely
registers, memory references and immediate values. For immediate values, we further
normalize them into two categories, memory oﬀsets (addresses) and constant values
as depicted in Figure 12a. The reason to diﬀerentiate between addresses and constant
values is that addresses would change according to diﬀerent assembly code layouts
while constant values do not. If an immediate value is classiﬁed as constant value, we
keep the literal value. The motivation is that normally constants stay the same even
when diﬀerent compilers or optimization levels have been used.






push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
mov     ecx, [ebp+adler]
push    ebx
mov     ebx, [ebp+len]
push    esi
mov     esi, ecx
and      ecx, 0FFFFh
shr       esi, 10h
push    0FFFFFFFFh
push    edi
mov     edi, [ebp+8]
call       sub_1001BDC0
cmp     dword ptr [edi+1Ch], 0
jnz        loc_1001C030
push    REG
mov     REG, REG
mov     REG, MEM
push    REG
mov     REG, MEM
push    REG
mov     REG, REG
and      REG, 0FFFFh
shr       REG, 10h     
push    0FFFFFFFFh
push    REG
mov     REG, MEM
call       OFFSET
cmp     MEM, 0
jnz        OFFSET
(b) An exemplary basic block and its normalized version
Figure 12: Basic block normalization
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In [29] David and Yahav replace an oﬀset with the string and take the string into
comparison if the oﬀset points to a string. But we consider only integers. The reason
is that strings can easily be modiﬁed without diﬃculty. A malware author could
easily evade those string based detection techniques by changing the strings inside
the source code without changing the functionality. However, the integers are more
related to the functionality, which makes them a better target in reverse engineering.
3.3 Instruction Comparison
Inspired by the recent work in [29], we use a similar strategy when comparing in-
structions. As depicted in Algorithm 1, for two normalized instructions, if they have
diﬀerent mnemonics, then their matching score is 0 regardless of their operands. Oth-
erwise, we give them a score for identical mnemonic and continue to compare their
operands. If their corresponding operands are the same after normalization, then we
give them an additional score for each matching operand. Notice that mnemonics rep-
resent the low-level machine operations and carry more information than operands,
thus we should give a higher score to identical mnemonic. At the same time, to
avoid the information carried by operands from getting neglected, this score could
not be overly high. Constants also carry much information from the source. When
comparing two constant operands, we further compare their literal values. If their
literal values are the same, we then give them an additional score. During our exper-
iments we found that it is appropriate to give score 1, 2 and 3 to identical operand,
mnemonic and constant respectively. Using these score values, we can allow those
important parts of instructions to match, and at the same time, without getting mis-
led by this score strategy. Following this strategy, we can calculate that the score of
comparing push eax with push ebx is 3, as both are push REG after normalization,
while the score of comparing push 0 with push 1 is only 2 as the literal value of their
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operands is not the same.
Algorithm 1: Compare two instructions
Input: Two normalized instructions
Output: The matching score of two instructions
1 Function CompIns(ins1,ins2)
2 score = 0
3 if ins1.Mnemonic == ins2.Mnemonic then
4 n = num of arguments(ins1)
5 score += IDENTICAL MNEMONIC SCORE
6 for i = 0; i < n; + + i do
7 if operand(ins1)[i] == operand(ins2)[i] then
8 if type(operand(ins1)[i]) == CONSTANTS then
9 score += IDENTICAL CONSTANT SCORE
10 else









Instead of comparing original instructions, we choose to compare the normalized
instructions. The ﬁrst advantage is more resistance to register reassignment, which is
very common in compiler optimization. Second, we want to do a fuzzy matching. This
is diﬀerent from what David and Yahav did in [29], where they use exact matching
when comparing operands. Besides, we allow partial matching. For example, we give
a score of 5 to instruction pair cmp [eax],0 and cmp ebx, 0, although they are two
types of instructions. The ﬁrst instruction is comparing an immediate value with
a memory reference while the second with an register. The reason for us to allow
partial matching is because even for the same variable, compilers have the freedom
to represent it as a register variable or a memory variable. Allowing partial matching
can tolerate these diﬀerences.
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3.4 Basic Block Comparison
Inspired by the recent work in [29], we leverage the longest common subsequence
(LCS) method of dynamic programming [28] to compare two basic blocks. The LCS
problem is to ﬁnd the longest subsequence which is common to both sequences. Sup-
pose we have two strings, s1 = “ABCAE” and s2 = “BAE”, and we want to ﬁnd their
LCS. Dynamic programming can be applied to solve this problem eﬃciently. The
general idea is to break down the problem into smaller and simpler problems until
the answer becomes straightforward. Table 2 shows the memoization table when
using dynamic programming to calculate the length of the LCS of these two strings.
Table 2: The memoization table when calculating the LCS of two string, the high-
lighted cells show the backtrack path
Following the path highlighted in Table 2, we can obtain the longest common
subsequence of these two strings, “BAE”, and its length is 3, as denoted in the last
cell of the table.
Note that a basic block is also a sequence of assembly instructions. We then
leverage the LCS to calculate the similarity score of two basic blocks. We consider
every instruction as a letter and use the score strategy presented in Algorithm 1
to obtain the matching score. Notice that we do not draw any conclusion about
whether these two basic blocks are identical or should be matched according to this
score. Unlike the work in [29], we just use the similarity score as a guide for later use.
As shown in Algorithm 2, the output is the largest similarity score that these
two basic blocks can achieve with respect to the score strategy we are using. By
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push    REG
mov     REG, REG
mov     REG, MEM
mov     REG, MEM
lea       REG, MEM    
shr       REG, 20h     
push    0FFFFFFFFh
push    REG
mov     REG, MEM
call       OFFSET
push    REG
mov     REG, REG
mov     REG, MEM
mov     REG, 20h
and      REG, 0FFFFh
shr       REG, 10h     
push    0FFFFFFFFh
push    REG
mov     REG, MEM
call       OFFSET
Figure 13: Example of instruction alignment and the lines represent the mapping of
instructions that gives the highest similarity score
backtracking the memoization table, we can also obtain the mapping of instructions
between this two basic blocks. Some literatures such as [29] also denote this process
of leveraging dynamic programming to obtain the mapping, as “alignment”. After
this “alignment”, instructions that cannot be matched can be jumped over. This
jumping over instructions is our fuzzy matching at the basic block level. However,
for now this mapping is of no interest to us, as we only need the maximum similarity
score. Note that there may be diﬀerent mappings that give us the same maximum
score, however, the maximum score is unique. In our algorithm, it is always in the
last cell of the memoization table.
push    0FFFFFFFFh
push    REG
mov     REG, MEM
call       OFFSET
cmp     MEM, 0
jnz        OFFSET
push    0FFFFFFFFh
push    REG
mov     REG, MEM
call       OFFSET
cmp     MEM, 0
jnz        OFFSET
Figure 14: Example of comparing a basic block with itself and the lines represent the
mapping of instructions that gives the highest similarity score
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A special case is to use Algorithm 2 to compare a basic block with itself. No
doubt that the highest score will be achieved only when every instruction is mapped
to itself as Figure 14 shows. We deﬁne that score as the “self” score of that basic
block. Intuitively, this score can be used to measure the information that a basic
block carries. A large basic block results in a high self score.
Algorithm 2: Calculate the similarity score of two basic blocks
Input: Two basic blocks BB1, BB2
Output: The similarity score of two basic blocks
/* M: the memoization table */
1 Algorithm CompBBs(BB1, BB2)
2 M = InitTable(|BB1|+ 1, |BB2|+ 1)
3 for i = 1; i <= |BB1|; + + i do
4 for j = 1; j <= |BB2|; + + j do
5 M [i, j] = Max(
6 CompIns(BB1[i], BB2[j]) +M [i− 1, j − 1],
7 M [i− 1, j],
8 M [i, j − 1])
9 end
10 end
11 return M [|BB1|, |BB2|]
12 end
3.5 Longest Path Generation
We have explained how to compare two basic blocks. For every basic block pair,
we can obtain a similarity score. The larger the score, the more similar these two
basic blocks are. However, this score is derived from the assembly code only, and is
thus not suﬃcient. For example, for one target basic block, we might ﬁnd multiple
basic blocks that have the same similarity score with it. Even worse, we may end
up matching it with a wrong basic block simply because its assembly code is more
similar to the target by chance.
Inspired by the recent work in [56], we realize that path in the CFG is a robust
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feature, since path can record every selection the execution ﬂow took when a branch
is encountered, and one path represents one complete particular execution. Notice
that the functionality of one path is spread across consisting nodes (basic blocks).
If we succeed in ﬁnding two paths that are equivalent in terms of functionality, it
would be trivial to further match their nodes. Again, we can treat the problem of
ﬁnding matching nodes as an alignment problem where dynamic programming can
be applied. Intuitively, one short path does not carry as much information as a long
path. Besides, the longer the path, the more matching nodes we could obtain by
aligning it with its matching path, which improves both the accuracy and eﬃciency
of neighborhood exploration process (Section 3.7). Thus, we choose the longest path.
We use depth ﬁrst search to traverse the CFG, and then choose the path with the
largest number of nodes.
3.6 Path Exploration
After we obtained the longest path of the target function, the next step is to explore
the reference function, to try to ﬁnd the best match of that path in the reference
function. We adopt the approach in [56] to do the exploration. In [56] Luo et al.
used a breadth-ﬁrst search combined with dynamic programming to compute the
highest score of longest common subsequence of semantically equivalent basic blocks.
In our case, we leveraged their algorithm to ﬁnd the corresponding path which has
the largest similarity score based on Algorithm 2.
The algorithm for path exploration is similar to the common dynamic program-
ming for computing the LCS of two strings. Since a path is also a sequence of basic
blocks, we can treat every basic block as a letter and use the Algorithm 2 as our score
strategy. However, there are two diﬀerences. First, the length of a string is constant,
thus when computing the LCS of two strings the length of the memoization table is
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also ﬁxed. In path exploration, however, we do not know the length of the memo-
ization table in advance, so we set the initial length to one (Line 2 in Algorithm 3)
and add more rows on the run (Line 9 in Algorithm 3). Second, the letters in a given
string are sequential; every previous letter has at most one letter following it while
a node in a CFG may have multiple successors. That is why we need to combine
breadth-ﬁrst search with the original dynamic programming.
We modiﬁed the algorithm in [56] to ﬁt our needs. Given a longest path P from
the target function and the CFG G of the reference function, we always start from the
head node ofG (Line 5 in Algorithm 3). At the beginning of each iteration, we pop out
a node from the working queue Q as the current node (Line 7 in Algorithm 3). Then
we add a new row to the memoization table δ and update the table correspondingly
using function LCS (Line 10 in Algorithm 3). It is worth noting that when comparing
the current node with every node in path P , we require them to have the same in-
degree and out-degree to be matched (Line 22 in Algorithm 3). Otherwise we do
not allow them to match by giving them a score of 0 (Line 25 in Algorithm 3). The
motivation is that we want to quickly match the “skeleton” of the CFG ﬁrst. If we
failed to match some nodes whose in-degree or out-degree have been changed, we can
leave them to the next step, neighborhood exploration. Also note that because of the
complexity of the CFG, there might be multiple paths that can lead the execution
ﬂow to a certain node. To improve the eﬃciency, it is important to reduce the search
space and prune the unproﬁtable path. To this end, we use an array σ to store the
largest similarity score that we have achieved so far for each node. Every time after
updating the table δ for certain node, we continue to compare the obtained new score
with the largest score stored in σ (Line 11 in Algorithm 3). If the new score is larger,
we then update σ and insert every successor of this node to our working queue Q.
Otherwise we do not further explore its successors. The algorithm terminates after
Q is empty. The output is the memoization table δ.
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Algorithm 3: Path Exploration
Input: P : the longest path from the target function, G: the CFG of the
reference function
Output: δ: The memoization table
/* σ: the array that stores the largest LCS score for every node
in G */
1 Function PathExploration(P ,G)
2 δ = InitTable(1, |P |+ 1)
3 σ = InitArray(|G|)
4 Q = InitQueue()
5 Q.pushback(G1) //always start from the head node
6 while Q is not empty do
7 currNode = Q.front()
8 Q.pop front()
9 δ.AddNewRow() //always add a new row to δ
10 LCS(currNode,P ) //compare currNode with every node in P and
update the table δ
11 if σ(currNode) < δ(currNode, |P |) then
12 σ(currNode) = δ(currNode, |P |)







20 Function LCS(u,P )
21 for each node v of P do
22 if SameDegree(u,v) then
23 sim = CompBB(u, v)
24 else
25 sim = 0
26 end
27 δ(u, v) = Max(


















(a) The CFGs of two versions of the same functions and the
grey nodes represent the longest path in the target CFG
(b) The memoization table
Figure 15: An example of path exploration for two CFGs
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Figure 15 presents an example. Figure 15a shows two simpliﬁed CFGs of two
functions from open source projects; the grey nodes denote the longest path we found
in the target CFG. These two functions are from the same source code. However
due to the noise introduced by the compiler, their structures are not isomorphism.
Basic block J in the target function consists of one “JMP” instruction, directing the
execution ﬂow to the tail block “6”. Basic block 3 in the target CFG modiﬁes the
value of a local variable in the stack. As can be seen from Figure 15a, basic block 3
does not have a corresponding basic block in the reference CFG because the compiler
used the register “ESI” to represent this variable in the reference function. Moreover,
the reference CFG has one more basic block R, that restores the original value of
“ESI”, and then directs the execution ﬂow to the tail.
To do the path exploration, we ﬁrst initialize the memoization table δ and array
σ. Then we insert the head node 1 of the candidate CFG to the working queue Q. We
compare node 1 with path P using the function LCS in Algorithm 3 and update the
memoization table correspondingly. Notice that here for the purpose of simplicity, we
assume that the matching score is either 1 or 0, while a true match has a score of 1,
otherwise 0. Since node 1 has two successors, node 6 and 2. We insert them into Q
and continue the exploration. Assume we visit node 6 ﬁrst, then node 2. Node 6 has
no successor, we then update the table δ for node 6, and continue to work on node 2.
Node 2 has two successors, node 6 and node 4. We also insert them into our working
queue. We ﬁrst work on node 6. Note that this is the second time we insert node
6 into Q. The ﬁrst time its parent node is 1, and the corresponding partial path is
“1→6”, this time its parent node is 2 and the partial path is “1→2→6”. We allow the
same node to be inserted into Q as long as they represent diﬀerent execution paths.
Node 6 has no successor. After we ﬁnish comparing node 6 with every node in path
P , the working queue Q has only one element: node 4. We then work on node 4. It
is worth noting that although node 4 in the reference CFG has a corresponding node
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(node 4) in the path P , the in-degrees of these two nodes are diﬀerent. Thus, we give
them a matching score of 0. Then we put the successors of node 4 into Q. Now Q has
two elements, node 5, and node R (parent is node 4). We visit node 5 ﬁrst, and put
its successor node R into Q. Now Q has two elements, node R from node 4 (partial
path “1→2→4→R”) and node R from node 5 (partial path “1→2→4→5→R”). Both
elements will lead us to node 6, but with diﬀerent LCS scores. The one from node
4 (complete path “1→2→4→R→6”) will have a ﬁnal score of 3 while the one from
node 5 (complete path “1→2→4→5→R→6”) gives us a score of 4.
We can then backtrack the memoization table δ to get the corresponding path
that has the largest sum of similarity score with the target longest path. However,
during our experiments we found that considering only the sum of the similarity score
may sometimes give undesirable results. We might wrongly match the target path
with a long path in the reference CFG. So we decided to normalize the similarity
score by taking the target and the found path into consideration. Recall that a path
is a sequence of basic blocks, and the self score of one basic block b can be calculated
as CompBB(b, b) using Algorithm 2. Then the self score of a path is the sum of self
scores of all the consisting basic blocks. We then normalize the score between the
target path P and the found path Pf using the following equation:
NormScore(P, Pf ) =
LCSScore
Score(P ) + Score(Pf )
where the LCSScore is the score obtained from the memoization table δ and Score()
is a function that returns the self score of the given path.
We then choose the path with the highest normalized score. By backtracking the
memoization table δ, we can obtain a mapping of basic blocks. In the example shown
in Figure 15 we can obtain 4 matching basic block pairs: basic block 1 with 1, 2 with
2, 5 with 5 and 6 with 6 in the target and reference, respectively.
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3.7 Neighborhood Exploration
While we can continue to extract more paths from the target function and match them
in the reference function, this is not eﬃcient. First, the path exploration process takes
time. Besides, when we explore certain target path in the reference function, some
of the basic blocks may have already been matched in previous paths and we cannot
gain much by rematching them. Inspired by the work in [67], we decided to use a
greedy, localized fuzzy matching approach to extend the existing mapping. Because
we already have all the mappings from path exploration of the longest path, there is a
high chance that we can ﬁnd the correct basic block mapping between two functions.
We ﬁrst put every matching basic block pair obtained from path exploration into
a priority queue based on their similarity score. Then we choose the pair on the top,
namely the pair with the largest similarity score as our starting point to initialize the
search. We then explore the neighbors of the chosen basic block pair. Note that for
every basic block pair in the queue, the two basic blocks have the same in-degree or
out-degree. We ﬁrst consider the successors of these two basic blocks if they have
the same out-degree. If they both have only one successor, then we match their
successors directly, unless it is inconsistent with the mapping we already have. If
they both have more than one successor, then we leverage the Hungarian algorithm
[63] to ﬁnd the best mapping between the two sets of successors that maximize the
sum of the similarity score. Similarly, if the found mapping is inconsistent with the
mapping we already have, we discard the corresponding match but continue to check
other successors. We then do the same to their predecessors if they have the same
in-degree.
It is important to note that for these found mapping pairs, the corresponding basic
blocks in the pair do not necessarily have the same in-degree or out-degree. If they
have the same in-degree, we put them into the priority queue but only explore their
predecessors later, when they become the element with the highest priority (similarity
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score) in the queue. If they have the same out-degree, we explore their successors.
If neither their in-degree nor out-degree is the same, we still allow these two basic
blocks to be matched, however, we do not put them into the priority queue. In other
words, we do not explore their neighborhood, because the likelihood of them being a
correct match is relatively lower. By doing this, we achieve a fuzzy matching between
the basic blocks of two functions. At the same time, if we mismatched a pair of basic
blocks, we can make sure that the error would not propagate as we require the same
in-degree or out-degree when exploring the neighborhood. On the other hand, for
basic blocks that are correctly matched, we could explore their neighborhood in two
directions eﬃciently.
We continue to do this until the priority queue is empty, i.e., until there is no more
neighbors to be explored, or all the neighbors have diﬀerent in-degree and out-degree
and can not be further explored. We then leverage the obtained matching basic
block pairs to calculate the similarity between the target function and the reference
function.
An assembly function can be looked at as a set of basic blocks, we then calculate
the self score of a function by adding the self scores of all the consisting basic blocks.
Given two functions, f and g, suppose γ is the set of all the matching basic block pairs
we obtained during path exploration and neighborhood exploration, the similarity of






where u, v are basic blocks, u ∈ f , v ∈ g and Score() is a function that returns the
self score of the given function.
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3.8 Filtering
We have introduced how to pairwise compare two functions. However, we still need to
address the scalability problem, especially when dealing with large data sets. Suppose
we have a function repository consisting of one million functions, to ﬁnd similar
functions to a given target function, we have to compare the target function with
every function in the repository and rank the results. This is not eﬃcient as a large
number of functions are not similar to the target and should not be compared.
To this end, we adopt a heuristic approach to prune the search space by excluding
functions that are not likely to be matched. We designed two ﬁlters, based on the
number of basic blocks and function ﬁngerprint similarity threshold, respectively.
Filtering By Number of Basic Blocks
The reason to ﬁlter by number of basic blocks is straightforward. It is very unlikely
that a function with only one basic block can be matched to another function with
one hundred basic blocks. Thus we set a number threshold. If we require two CFGs
to be exactly the same, namely isomorphic, then the basic block numbers should
also be the same. Since BinSequence performs a fuzzy matching, which allows two
structurally-diﬀerent functions to be matched, the numbers of basic block should be
allowed to be diﬀerent. So we set up a threshold. This threshold should not be too
small, as we may rule out the correct match. On the other hand, the threshold should
not be too large. Otherwise we cannot save much time as not many functions can be
ruled out.
If the CFGs of two functions are isomorphic, they will have the same number of
basic blocks. Even when they were slightly changed due to noise introduced by the
compiler, the numbers are still very close. One thing that could change the basic
block number is function inlining, where the assembly code of a small function was
directly inlined in another function, to avoid the calling overhead. However, inlining
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only happens when the size of function is relatively small. So it will not signiﬁcantly
change the number of basic blocks.
Assume the threshold is γ, given a target function f , those functions whose sizes
are between |f | − γ and |f |+ γ will pass this ﬁlter.
Filtering By Fingerprint Similarity
The next ﬁlter is based on the syntactic property of the code. For every function,
we use its normalized instruction set as its ﬁngerprint. More speciﬁcally, we use the
same technique as introduced in Section 3.2 to normalize all the instructions inside
a function, to get the normalized instruction set. Given a target function, we then
calculate the Jaccard similarity (index) between the ﬁngerprints of the target and
every function in the repository. If the Jaccard similarity is above a certain threshold,
we then continue to compare the function against the target. Otherwise we simply
discard it.
In order to avoid pairwise comparison of ﬁngerprints, we leveraged minhashing
[18] and the banding technique [69]. Minhashing is a technique of using k diﬀerent
hash functions to generate the minhash signature. The banding technique divides
the minhash signature into b bands of r rows each. Given a target function, we ﬁrst
generate its ﬁngerprint and the minhash signature of its ﬁngerprint. We divide its
minhash signature into b bands of r rows, each. Then the candidate set should be all
the functions whose minhash signatures agree in all the rows of at least one band with
the signature of the target function. More generally, if we choose n hash functions, b
bands, r rows and n = br, the Jaccard similarity threshold t imposed by this banding
technique is approximately 1/b1/r [69].
In general, similar to the ﬁlter using number of basic blocks, this ﬁlter is lossy as
well. Some true matches may have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent normalized instruction set,
and consequently, fail to pass this ﬁlter. To address this problem, in our implemen-
tation, we choose b and r so that t = 1/b1/r equals to a relatively low value, e.g.,
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0.65, so that those functions that are true matches, but with low Jaccard similarity
could pass this ﬁlter and remain in the candidate set. After using these techniques, to
root out all the functions whose Jaccard similarity is above certain threshold, we only
need to ﬁrst choose b and r so that the desired threshold is imposed by the banding
technique. and then select all the functions whose minhash signatures agree in all
the row of at least one band with the signature of the target function, which can be
achieved by one time lookup in the database.
3.9 Summary
We have presented the detailed design of our approach. Given a target function and
a repository of thousands or millions of functions, we ﬁrst use the ﬁltering process to
get a subset (candidate set) of promising functions from the repository that might
be similar to the target. The ﬁltering process consists of two ﬁlters. The ﬁrst ﬁlter
is based on the number of basic blocks, while the second is based on ﬁngerprint
similarity. After the candidate set has been obtained, we then compare the target
function with each function in the candidate set using a fuzzy matching approach.
The fuzzy matching approach operates at three diﬀerent levels: instruction level,
basic block level and control ﬂow structure level. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst generate
the longest path of the target function. Then we explore the reference function in the
candidate set to ﬁnd the corresponding matching path, from which we can obtain the
initial mapping of basic blocks. We then improve the mapping through neighborhood
exploration in both the target and reference functions. The output is the mapping
of basic blocks and the similarity score of these two functions. Finally, we rank the




We conducted extensive experiments to evaluate BinSequence in terms of accuracy,
performance and scalability. We also performed several experiments on practical
scenarios to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of BinSequence when applied
to real-world use cases. All experiments were performed on a PC with an Intel Xeon
E31220 Quad-Core processor, 16 GB of RAM running Microsoft Windows 7 64-bit.
4.1 Function Reuse Detection
The ﬁrst experiment is function reuse detection from a large repository. We ﬁrst try
to perform function reuse detection between two versions of the same binary. In this
experiment, four diﬀerent versions of zlib libraries [15], namely 1.2.5 through 1.2.8
were used. Since zlib is a well maintained library, we assumed functions with identical
function (symbolic) name across diﬀerent versions should have the same or similar
functionality, and thus, should be matched. We also introduced one group of noise
functions, which are all the functions of 1,701 system dynamic library ﬁles obtained
from Microsoft Windows operating system. The total size of these ﬁles is around 1
GB and the total number of functions is 2,055,584. It took BinSequence 14 hours
and 52 minutes to import all these functions into the repository.
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Every time we use the previous version of zlib to match the next version of zlib.
For example, we ﬁrst use zlib 1.2.5 as our target set, and put all the functions of
its successive version zlib 1.2.6 together with the two million noise functions into the
database. Then for every function (with at least four basic blocks) in zlib 1.2.5, we
use BinSequence to search for it. Only when the corresponding function in zlib 1.2.6 is
ranked the ﬁrst, which means it has the highest similarity, we consider it as a correct
match. Otherwise we consider it as wrongly matched. We then do the same thing to
other versions of zlib.
For all the tests, we used three diﬀerent ﬁngerprint similarity thresholds: 0.6,
0.65 and 0.7. Using the techniques explained in Section 3.8, those functions whose
ﬁngerprint similarity below these thresholds would be ruled out. Intuitively as we
increase the ﬁngerprint similarity threshold, the number of functions that could pass
this ﬁlter would decrease. So we choose three diﬀerent values to thoroughly study its
eﬀect. The threshold for the number of basic blocks is set to 35 in this experiment.
If we want to tolerate more “noise”, we can also set this threshold to a larger value.
Table 3a shows the result. Recall that for every target function, we use two ﬁlters
to obtain a small candidate set from the whole database. The column “Candidate
Size” is the sum of the size of the candidate sets for every target function. Intuitively,
as we increase the similarity threshold, we end up with a smaller candidate set. As a
result, the processing time decreases. We expected that as we increase the ﬁngerprint
threshold, the overall accuracy would drop (like zlib 1.2.5 in the table), or at the
best would stay the same (like zlib 1.2.6 in the table) because we would get a smaller
candidate set and the true match could have been ruled out. The zlib 1.2.7 was
a surprise. As we increased the ﬁngerprint threshold from 0.6 to 0.7, the overall
accuracy increased from 96.52% to 98.26%. We looked into the reason. When the
ﬁngerprint threshold is 0.6, there were two functions, whose true matches did not have
the largest similarity; instead, two other functions that happened to have similar code
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Version
Fingerprint Overall Candidate Time
Threshold Accuracy Size (per function)
1.2.5
0.6 96.26% 12346 2.806s
0.65 94.39% 2727 1.468s
0.7 91.59% 1911 0.897s
1.2.6
0.6 100% 16315 2.927s
0.65 100% 2848 1.558s
0.7 100% 1989 0.913s
1.2.7
0.6 96.52% 16312 2.884s
0.65 97.39% 2847 1.572s
0.7 98.26% 1988 0.918s
(a) Function reuse detection between diﬀerent versions of zlib
Version
Fingerprint Overall Candidate Time
Threshold Accuracy Size (per function)
1.2.8
0.6 92.5% 3526 2.204s
0.65 92.5% 751 1.258s
0.7 92.5% 242 0.95s
(b) Function reuse detection between zlib and libpng
Table 3: Results for function reuse detection
and structure were ranked ﬁrst. The true matches were ranked #2. As we increased
the ﬁngerprint similarity threshold from 0.6 to 0.7, these two functions were ruled
out by the ﬁlter; as a result, those true matches become the ones with the highest
similarity. This also suggest that though our ﬁlters are in general lossy, however do
not necessarily always decrease the accuracy.
We also conducted function reuse detection between two diﬀerent binaries: zlib
and libpng [11]. Libpng is a library for processing PNG image format ﬁles and it
is dependent on zlib library. As a result, part of the functions from zlib library are
reused by libpng. We ﬁrst compiled zlib 1.2.8 and libpng 1.6.17 with the debugging
information attached. By manually checking both libraries, we identiﬁed 40 functions
that were user functions in zlib and were reused in libpng. We then used these 40
functions (with at least four basic blocks) in zlib as our target functions, and searched
for them in the repository. If the corresponding function in libpng is ranked ﬁrst, we
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consider it as a correct match. As shown in Table 3b, we correctly identiﬁed 37 reused
functions for all the three diﬀerent ﬁngerprint thresholds, and the overall accuracy
was consistently 92.5%.
4.2 Patch Analysis
The next experiment is to use BinSequence to recover vulnerability information.
Nowadays as a result of the development of vulnerability mining techniques, more
vulnerabilities are being discovered everyday. After a vulnerability is reported to the
software vendor, they would release a security patch to ﬁx it often without revealing
the details of the vulnerability or the part of code they have modiﬁed to the public.
By comparing the patched and unpatched version of the binaries, reverse engineers
can analyze and understand the vulnerability and the patch within hours. This kind
of technique is especially useful for Microsoft’s binaries as they release the patch reg-
ularly and the patched vulnerability are concentrated in small areas in the binary
[66].
We take a recently patched vulnerability, namely MS15-034 [12] as a case to study.
There is a vulnerability in HTTP.sys. When an attacker sends a specially crafted
HTTP request to an aﬀected system, the HTTP protocol stack may parse it improp-
erly. As a result, the attacker may execute arbitrary code. Microsoft released a patch
MS15-034 to address this problem. In order to reveal the information of the vulner-
ability and the patch, we used BinSequence to compare the unpatched and patched
version of HTTP.sys. Since this is to ﬁnd out which functions have been patched, we
only report functions whose similarity is not 1 after being patched, as similarity 1
means the function remains identical (after normalization) in the patched version.
In total, BinSequence identiﬁed 11 functions, whose similarity is not 1 between
the patched and unpatched version. We manually checked these 11 function pairs and
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found out that 6 functions were actually the same, but were disassembled diﬀerently







Table 4: Patched functions
According to the analysis in [13], among these ﬁve function pairs three of them
are related to the vulnerability, namely UlpParseRange, UlpDuplicateChunkRange
and UlAdjustRangesToContentSize. We ﬁrst take a look at the UlpParseRange
function. As shown in Figure 16a and 16b, both the pathched and unpatched versions
have 60 basic blocks. BinSequence successfully matched all the basic blocks. Among
all these pairs, 59 pairs have a similarity of 1, which means they remain the same
after being patched (after normalization). The only basic block pair highlighted in
red in Figure 16a and 16b shows where the patch took place, basic block number 45.
Figure 16c depicts the basic block 45 before and after the patch. We can clearly see
that the patched version was calling a function RtlUlongLongAdd while the unpatched
version does not. We can infer that the original function might contain an integer
overﬂow vulnerability. The patched version invokes the RtlULongLongAdd to ﬁx it.
Moreover, we can see that their out-degrees of these two basic blocks have been
changed. The out-degree of the unpatched is 1 while the patched is 2. Despite this
structure change, our fuzzy structure matching approach still succeed in matching
these two basic blocks.
We continue to look at the UlpDuplicateChunkRange function. As depicted in
Figure 17a and 17b, the unpatched version has 31 basic blocks while the patched
has 37 basic blocks. BinSequence successfully matched all the 31 basic blocks in the
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(a) The UlpParseRange function
before patch




















(c) The basic block 45 before and after patched, the out-degree
is 1 and 2, correspondingly






Figure 17: The UlpDuplicateChunkRange function
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unpatched version to their counterparts in the patched version. Six basic blocks in
the patched version are not matched, thus, we can infer that they are inserted to
patch the vulnerability. Figure 18 shows the detail of the ﬁrst three inserted basic
blocks. Basic block 9, 10, 11, 12 in the unpatched function are matched to basic
block 9, 10, 11, 15 in the patched function, respectively. Basic block 12, 13, 14 in
the patched are newly inserted. We can see that the inserted basic block 12 invokes
the RtlULongLongAdd function as well and makes one conditional jump based on the
return value. Our fuzzy matching approach successfully jumped over these inserted














































































Figure 18: One of the patched parts of the UlpDuplicateChunkRange function
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4.3 Malware Analysis
Our next experiment is conducted on two well known malware, Citadel and Zeus.
We know that the Citedel is derived from Zeus [62]. We also know that Zeus uses
RC4 stream cipher function, and Citadel reused this function with modiﬁcation [68].
Given the RC4 function in Zeus, our intention is to use BinSequence to identify the
reused RC4 function in Citadel.
We ﬁrst disassembled Zeus using IDA Pro and extracted the RC4 function. We
then used it as our target function. We also disassembled Citadel and then compared
the target function with every function in Citadel, and ranked the results according to





Table 5: The result of searching RC4 function in Citadel
We manually checked the sub 42E92D function, and conﬁrmed that this is the
modiﬁed RC4 function in Citadel. In total IDA Pro identiﬁed 794 assembly function
in Citadel. That is to say, we successfully identiﬁed the modiﬁed RC4 function from
these 794 functions.
Since 794 functions is a relatively small data set, so we put the RC4 function in
Citadel into those 2 million functions we used in Section 4.1 and redid the experi-
ment. Still, BinSequence ranked the modiﬁed RC4 function as ﬁrst, from a function
repository with more than 4 million functions.
Figure 19a and Figure 19b show the RC4 function in Zeus and Citadel respec-
tively. Clearly we can see these two CFGs are by no means isomorphic, yet BinSe-
quence ranked the modiﬁed RC4 ﬁrst with the highest similarity. Again, this result
demonstrates that our fuzzy matching approach is eﬀective and accurate.
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(a) The RC4 function in Zeus (b) The modiﬁed RC4 function in Citadel
Figure 19: The RC4 function
We also looked into the diﬀerences between the RC4 functions of these two mal-
ware. Unlike Zeus, the RC4 function in Citadel has a MD5 hashed login key [68].
At the beginning of the RC4 function of Citadel, the strlen function is invoked to
calculate the length of this hashed login key. Following is a conditional jump instruc-
tion that direct the execution ﬂow to two diﬀerent branches based on the length of
the login key. Other than that, an additional encryption step is performed using this
hashed login key before generating the ﬁnal encryption output. As a result, both the
control ﬂow structure and the basic blocks of the RC4 in Citadel have been changed
compared to the RC4 function in Zeus. This is the reason why the similarity between
these two RC4 functions is only 0.689474, which is relatively low. In fact, most of the
functions in Zeus have counterparts in Citadel with a higher similarity. More speciﬁ-
cally, for 373 (67%) functions in Zeus, Binsequence identiﬁed matches in Citadel with
a similarity of 1.0, which means they are exactly identical (after normalization) and
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513 (92.1%) functions with a similarity above 0.8. This also conﬁrms that Citadel
reused most of the Zeus’s functions (functionality). Now when reverse engineering
Citadel, the human analyst can focus on those new components and functionality,
instead of reanalyzing these reused functions.
4.4 Bug Search
The next experiment is also a use case bug search. There is a heap-based buﬀer
overﬂow in resize context buffers function in libvpx library and Firefox uses this
library [5]. Our intention is to use the resize context buffers function in libvpx
as our target function and identify the buggy function in the repository if there is
any.
According to the vulnerability datasource [5], this bug only exists in Firefox be-
fore 40.0.0. So in the ﬁrst experiment, we used Firefox 39.0.0 and 40.0.0 as the ﬁrst
contains this vulnerability and the second does not. We compiled Firefox by our-
selves with debug symbols so that we can see the function name when disassembling
Firefox. Table 6 shows the results. BinSequence successfully ranked the vulnerable
resize context buffers function in Firefox 39.0.0 and its patched version in Firefox
40.0.0 as ﬁrst.
Firefox Function Similarity Rank
39.0.0 resize context buffers 1.000000 1/149,784
40.0.0 resize context buffers 0.709524 1/152,618
Table 6: Search results for Firefox 39.0.0 and 40.0.0
In total Firefox 39.0.0 and 40.0.0 have 302,402 functions. By setting the basic
number number threshold to 35, and the ﬁngerprint similarity threshold to 0.6, we
end up with a candidate set with a size of 5. The overall running time was 0.468s.
The reason that resize context buffers function in Firefox 39.0.0 has a sim-
ilarity of 1 with the target is that we used the same compiler and optimization
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level to compile both functions, as a result their code are highly similar. The
resize context buffers function in Firefox 40.0.0 has been patched, so their simi-
larity is no longer 1, but still it has the largest similarity with the target among these
152,618 functions.
We also downloaded diﬀerent versions of Firefox from 33.0.0 to 40.0.0 from the
oﬃcial web site [8] directly. We only considered the main version and ignore those
subversions like 33.0.1.
Firefox Function Similarity Rank
40.0.0 sub 116D3D02 0.427699 1/161,932
39.0.0 sub 1165C97B 0.657224 1/159,589
38.0.0 sub 1153BA02 0.657224 1/155,299
37.0.0 sub 1155BD63 0.657224 1/151,416
36.0.0 sub 115F7CB3 0.657224 1/152,032
35.0.0 sub 100CB36B 0.268199 1/142,304
34.0.0 sub 101800DA 0.268199 1/138,329
33.0.0 sub 108F3DA4 0.141892 1/135,621
Table 7: Search results for diﬀerent versions of Firefox
In total there are 1,196,522 functions in these 8 versions of Firefox, and it took
0.271 second for BinSequence to ﬁnish the whole comparison. As the Table 7 shows,
BinSequence uniquely identiﬁed the equivalent buggy function in Firefox 36.0.0,
37.0.0, 38.0.0, 39.0.0. We manually checked the assembly and the source code and
conﬁrmed the found functions indeed are the buggy functions. For Firefox 33.0.0
through 35.0.0, BinSequence found three functions with a relatively low similarity.
We found that these three versions of Firefox were using a diﬀerent version of lib-
vpx. As a result, the buggy function actually does not exist in these three versions.




In this experiment, we compare BinSequence with Diaphora [6], PatchDiﬀ2 [14] and
BinDiﬀ [3] for function matching. Both Diaphora and PatchDiﬀ2 are IDA Pro plugins
for program diﬃng and BinDiﬀ is the de facto standard commercial tool for comparing
binary ﬁles. All these tools can compare two versions of the same binary and create
a mapping of functions between them. It is worth noting that BinSequence is not
conﬁned to comparing two binaries. In this experiment, given a target function in one
binary, we use BinSequence to compare the target with every function in the other
binary and match the target to the function with the largest similarity score.
Throughout this experiment, we continue to use zlib 1.2.8. However, we compile
it in release mode using two diﬀerent compilers, namely MSVC 2010 and MSVC 2013.
The reason of choosing these two compilers is to introduce certain “noise” into the
code. We then use the functions in zlib 1.2.8 compiled by MSVC 2010 as out target
set, and functions compiled by MSVC 2013 as the candidate set. For every non-
empty function (with at least 4 instructions) in the target set, we use BinSequence
to ﬁnd the matching function (with the highest similarity) in the candidate set. In
this experiment, all the function names of both binaries are stripped away. But we
use the function names in the program debug database as the ground truth, to verify






Diaphora [6] 105 10 29 72.92%
PatchDiﬀ2 [14] 110 28 6 76.39%
BinDiﬀ [3] 130 5 9 90.28%
BinSequence 135 0 9 93.75%
Table 8: Comparison with other tools
Table 8 shows the results. In total, our target set has 144 functions with more
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than 4 instructions. Diaphora correctly matched 105 functions. However, for 10 func-
tions, Diaphora failed to match them and categorized them to “Unmatched” group.
Moreover, Diaphora mismatched 29 functions. The overall accuracy for Diaphora is
about 72.92%. PatchDiﬀ2 correctly matched 110 function and mismatched 6 func-
tions. For 28 functions, PatchDiﬀ2 failed to ﬁnd any match. Similarly, if BinDiﬀ
failed to match one function with another, BinDiﬀ will classify it into “Unmatched”.
As shown in Table 8, there are 5 functions that BinDiﬀ failed to match. However,
Given one target function, BinSequence simply compares it with every function in
the candidate set and match it to the one with the highest similarity. As a result,
BinSequence has no “Unmatched” category.
We can see from Table 8 that BinSequence achieves the highest accuracy, 93.75%.
The reason is that BinSequence is performing a fuzzy matching, which can better
address the mutations introduced by diﬀerent compilers. Also note that during the
whole comparison process, BinSequence did not take the call graph into consideration.
On the contrary, BinDiﬀ would leverage call graph to match as many functions as
possible. By considering the control ﬂow graph alone, BinSequence achieved a higher




Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis we presented a fast, accurate and scalable binary code reuse detection
system named BinSequence. Unlike previous works, we focus on fuzzy matching that
operates at instruction level, basic block level and control ﬂow structure level. To
enable BinSequence on large data sets, we designed two ﬁlters to save analysis eﬀort by
ruling out functions that are not likely to be matched. Experiments were conducted
on sheer volume of executables, and the results strongly suggest that BinSequence
can achieve high quality function ranking.
We also applied BinSequence on many practical use case. By leveraging BinSe-
quence on both patched and unpatched executables, we succeeded in revealing the
vulnerability and the patch information. By performing function reuse detection, we
managed to identify the reused RC4 function in two real-world malware, Zeus and
Citadel. We also successfully identiﬁed the buggy function in various versions of Fire-
fox. The comparison of BinSequence with three state of the art tools also suggests
that our tool can achieve the best accuracy when compared with these tools. We be-
lieve that BinSequence can be of great help in many reverse engineering and security
scenarios.
However, during experiments we also observed several limitations. We now brieﬂy
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introduce them and propose some solutions as future directions.
• Function inlining: If a target function is inlined in another function, then our
approach may not match these two functions. However, normally function in-
lining only happens to small functions. Consequently, their functionality are
straightforward, and it does not really help reverse engineers much to search
for them from a large function repository. On the other hand, if our target
function inlined another small function, then still there is a high chance that
BinSequence can match them since we are doing a fuzzy matching.
• Equivalent instructions: The compiler may use diﬀerent instructions to accom-
plish the same functionality. For example, mov eax, 0 and xor eax, eax have
the same functionality but diﬀerent mnemonics. However, they will be normal-
ized to diﬀerent instructions by our approach. Future versions of BinSequence
may overcome this limitation by dividing instructions into diﬀerent classes and
let instructions in the same class to be matched.
• Control ﬂow ﬂattening: When comparing functions, we take the structure of
their CFGs into consideration. So control ﬂow ﬂattening could pose a problem.
In fact, during experiments, we encountered two versions of the same function,
one with a size of 9 basic blocks while the other with only 1 basic block. For
example, the compiler can use one condition move instruction like cmovbe to
perform the job that originally requires two diﬀerent branches in CFG. In that
case it is hard for us to match these two functions. Future work may involve
merging basic blocks, or spiliting one basic into multiple basic blocks, to achieve
a better matching for this case.
Besides, for now BinSequence relies on the longest path to generate matching basic
block pairs as starting points to initiate the neighborhood search. Future versions of
BinSequence may take more paths into account, or leverage other diﬀerent techniques
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to generate more starting points more eﬃciently.
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